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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1. The Problem
This dissertation is concerned with panpsychisn] as a meta-
phys-'cs and more especially as a solution to the mind-body
problem. '.7ard and Stron-^ are chosen for invest icration primarily
as representatives of the two si=rnificant kinds of panpsychistic
theory, as thinkers who have conscientiously follo-.vei out the
implications of monadism and the mind-stuff theory, and whose
writings clearly reveal the merits an:', defects of these syste:ns.
The attempt is thus m,ade to clcarify the distinction between
Ward's idealistic and Strong's realistic panpsychism. In or^ier
t"^ attain this end certain questions must be answered. V/hat
methods of philosophical investigation do the holders of these
^
systems follow? To wha.t extent do these syste- s rest upon an
em.pirical basis? '^-'ow adeq_uately do they explain the mind-body
relation'' Hov; successfullv do they account for the factor of
continu'tv in n-^.ture? What are their implications for ethics and
the "ohilosophy of religion? Since the major interest of this
dissertation is metaphysical, epistemolof^ical factors are intro-
duced onlv when they have a specific bearing upon the metaphysical.
2. Definition of Fundamental Terms
Manv terms are define:! at the time of their actual intro-
duction and use in this paper. Yet a few are so funiiamental to
Ii
t^.e dissertation as a whole and are used on so many occasions
that they mav well be defined at the start. ./'ost important or an
is the term panpsychisTn itself. 't is derived fro^n the Ireek
wordST^^/, 3ll , and jf^aXv , '^oul. Panpsychism, in coHi-non v/ith other
forns of mental ism, holds that everv real entity is psychical or
mental, possessing the attributes of a spiritual being. Its dis-
tinctive character consists in its theory that the physicaJ world
is composed of individual psychical elements which bear essentially
the saT.e relation to the 7;orld ^tround as do human minds.
Panpsychism. .. .does not insist that 'mind' has no degrees
and must be present if at all in unlimited fashion,
/^uite the contrary, panpsychism insists always upon the
c^raduated or relative character of mentality. It...
emphasizes that a d05!:'s mind is less of a mind than a
man's, and that of a moron less than that of a genius.
And it points out that this diminution of mentality need
not stop at the dog or the -frog or even the amoeba.
Relatively and for many purposes we may gay that the dog
is mindless; still more that a protozoon a,nd even more
emphatically th:-:t a molecule is mindless, unconscious,
purposeless. But that such creatures are absolutely
without the least dep-ree of that which reaches a high
defr.ree in human av/areness and purpoge--this the panpsychist
will not admit. And he further will not admit that the
lower degrees of awareness are d.ue to the dilution of
mind by its mixture with increasing doses of another
something, matter. He points out that when consciousness
is lowered, as when one is falling asleep, there is no
intrusion of a foreign element but simply the decrease
in vividnes s of the aspects of awareness itself. The
limit of this decrease in vividness is not matter but
non-existence. The absolute opposite of infinite aware-
ness is simplv complete unav/areness
.
One of the advant:'^.r^es of this statement is that in most respects
it applies to all varieties of panpsvchism. Yet there are at
least two important, well defined, and quite distinct kinds of
Hartshorne, EH, 169-170.

3panpgychisra.
The first of these is the idealistic or monadistic type.
It is defined bv Ledger Wood as "a form of metaphysical idealism,
of which Leibniz's theorv of monads is the classical example,
according- t? which the whole of nature consists of psychic centers
similar to the human mind." These psychic centers, it should
be noted, are independent in the sense that they never combine
to form a his-her type of m.ind. The well developed mind is always
a hiQ;her indivisible monad, never a combination of lower monads.
An association of lov/er monads may, however, form the bodily
environment of the mind.
The realistic tvpe of panpsychism, generally known as the
mind-stuff or mind-dust theory, differs from the monadistic
type primarily in its failure to preserve the unity, indivisibility,
and independence of the psychic centers. In fact it is doubtful
v/hether the psychic substance of the realistic panpsychist can
be referred to as composed of centers. This mind-stuff s;oe3
below the level of 'psychic centers similar to the human mind.',
and its elements may co-nbine to form such a mind. This view
"recognizes no irreducible and ultimate egos, souls, spirits or
personalities.' The following v/ords of Durant Drake well des-
cribe t^is view.
The term 'panpsychism' may properly be applied to our
theorv, but we must understand that it is only mind-
stuff that is universal, not mind itself .... The w'-ole
^Runes, DP, 223.
^Spaulding, NR, 268.

world is indeed in a sense alive. But it does not know
itself t? be alive. It is an enormously intricate
pattern of Dsychic units, continually changinjr their
interrelations. But these units have no way of knowing
anythinf^ of the pattern or the change. They are, perhaps,
all alike.... If this is so, it is onl- the ceaselessly
varying p'-.tterna that are different, not the units
the-Tis elves ... .The stuff that is deployed in this or that
order throufrhout the universe is the same sort, of stuff
that composes us, sentient beinprs that v/e are.
I do not see how there could be perception or memory or
any other conscious process, except as a phase of the
life of complex orphan isms. If so, c onsciousness m.ust
not be attributed to anything of which we knov/ except
living organisms. By saying that all matter is
'psychic' in nature I mean merely that it is of similar
substance to that of which our life is composed.-^
How the unity of consciousness may be explained by a theory
which recognizes only psvchic particles as ultimate will be
seen in a later treatment of the relation of this view to the
identity theory of mind-body relation.
\7ith respect to the term realism as used in this paper it
shO'J.ld be noted th^t it does not refer to the ontological reality
of universals as in mediaeval philosoohy nor to a belief in the
trustworthiness of sense-perception as in naive realism. Unless
otherwise noted, the term realism is here used only to refer to
physical realism, critical realism, and neorealism .--all dualisms.
With respect to the mind-body relation the several theories
are defined in terms of causal relation between the mind and the
physical organism. Automatism means that body completely deter-
mines m.ind and mind never influences b':^dy; parallelism means that
im, 99..
'Art. (1930) , 288.

neither bodA-- nor mind ever influences the other; interact ionism
means that body and nind in^^luence each other mutually.
James '.Yard was born at Hull, .^no-land, on January 27, 1843.
He v/as educated at '^'pring Hill Golle=r,9, Birmingham, at the uni-
versities of -erlin and, 1-bttingen, and at Trinity Colle^,e,
Cambridp;e. 'ATiiie at G-bttinf^en he was strongly influenced by
Lotze. 7rom IS70 to I872 he held a pastorate at Cambridge, re-
si^ninfT it because of his loss of faith in conservative Christianit
In 1875 he became Fellov of Trinity ^ollege, Cambridge. In I885
his reputation Y/as established bv the publication of his article
on psychology in the ninth edition of the Sncyclopaedia Bri t annic a.
In 1894 he was C-ifford Lecturer at Aberdeen, these lectures
bein^ l'?.ter published as Naturalism and Agnosticism. In 1897
he was elected to the new Chair of >:ental Philosophy and LoG:ic
at Cambrid..'2:e . From 1907 to 1910 he delivered another series of
^-ifford Lectures at St. Andrev/s. These formed The Realm of Ends
,
published in 1911. He continued to hold the chair at Cambridge
throurrh his eighty- second year. His death, the result of an
automobilG acc'dent, occurred March 4, 1925. Other factors in
his life will be mentioned in connection with his influence and
Cf. Pratt, 236. Sometimes included under parallelism is
the view that v/hat is perceived as consciousness through intro-
spection is identical with what is perceived as brain through
the senses. Actually, however, greater clarity may be achieved
by calling t-'is view the double-asoect theory or identity
theory.

place in x^hilosophy.
Charles Aue;ustus Strong was born at Haverhill, Zaasachuaetts
,
on TTovemher 23, 1862. In 1884 he received his A.E. from the
Universit^^ of Rochester and the next vear an A, P. from Harvard.
He then studied at Rochester Theolo^rical Seminary and in G-ermany
and France. His studies in G-ermany resuD.ted in his losing faith
in conservative Chr '. stianitv and this brouc^ht about a permanent
estrangement betv/een Strong and his father 7/ho was the president
6f Rochester Theological Seminary, From 188? to 1889 Strong was
instructor in philosophy at Cornell. The year 1890 found him a
decent at Clark University. Next he became associate professor
of TDhiloso^hy at the Universitv of Chicago (1892-1895). He
then went to Columbia University where from. 1895 to 1903 he v/as
lecturer in philosophy and from 1903 to 1910 professor of
philosoDhy. He then retired to "^iesole, Italy, where he spent '
the remainder of his life, most of w^'ich was spent in invalidism.
He continued, however, to write books and articles until the time
of his death, which occurred at Florence on January 23, 1940.
3. Organization
The organization of this paper is built around the concept,
already stated, that there are two si=rnificant kinds of pan-
psychism, the monad theory and the mind-stuff theory. The second
chapter is devoted to tracin,<2; the historical background of these
two theories
. from primitive animism and h 'lozoism through
Hlcolaus of Cusa and leibniz in the case of monadism and through
J
SDinoza, Fechner, and Clifford in the case of the mind-^tuff
f^'.eory. The third chapter is in the nature of an orientation,
attemptin<5 to clarif-^ the relation of these kinds of pan-
psychism to contenporar-"' schools of metaphysics and to the major
theories of mind-body relationship. The fourth chapter presents
several factors held in common "by 'Yard as supporter of the monad
theory and hy Strong as supporter of the mind-stuff theory. The
fifth chapter undertakes a presentation and analysis of the more
Impiccrtant characteristics of Strong's thought. The sixth chapter
does the same with the thought of 'A'ard. The seventh chapter con-
cerns itself with the influence and place in philosophy held hy
Stron?^ and '7ard and hence necesss.rilv the influence of the theorie
^hic^ t^e-"- represent. In the evaluation of the work of these
two thinkei's , the criticisms already made against them are re-
viewed and amplified. In the eighth and fl. nal chapter certain '
implications of the two kinds of panpsychist ic theorv under con-
sideration are traced with respect to psychological theory, to
human freedom, to the problem of evil, ani to immortality.
4. Previous Studies in the Field
On the subject of Ward the first two works which should be
mentioned are two dissertations previously written in the Boston
University Department of Philosophy, that of John Sedberry
Marshall entitled Th e Continuum in James "'ard's Psy choloc^y sub-
mitted in 1926 and t^Tat of Joseoh Scott Pennepacker entitled

The 3ody-:-lnd Problem in Ja-iea Ward' s Philosophy sutoitted in
1936. These dissertations "both present thorouQ;h treatments of
specific phases of -Yard's thou-^nt. Their int er"oretat i ons of
?/ard ' s concept of the continuu:a iiTfer to so:rie extent, .Marshall
emphasizing its metaphysical and Pennepacker its psycholoniical
inplications . Thouj^h their treatr^ents necessarily involve IVard ' s
monadism in more than an incidental way, this does.:not constitute
the central thouc^ht of either dissertation. The present paper
differs from the dissertations of both :arshall and Pennepacker
in that Ward is ^-ere considered primarily as a representative
of idealistic monadistic pannsychism whose works clearly reveal
t--^e '-^rits and defects of such a system.
Aside from these dissertations the best v/ork on '.Yard has
undoubtedly been that of his British associates,
-S-. Dawes Kicks,
Norman Kemp Smith, James Muirhead, G-eors;e F. Stout, and '\.
Sorley. Especially noteworthy are the articles written by
7 8Hicks' and Sorley just after 'Vard ' s death. The section on
Ward in Torm.an Kemp Smith's Prolegomena to an Idealisti c Theory
of Imowl ed2:e (1924) is also somewhat illuminat ina;. Both Smith
and. Hicks have been accused of read ins: too many of their own
ideas into t^eir interpretation of Ward; yet their personal
acquaintance with Wa.rd and their observation of the development
of his ^vBte^ p"ive th"lr opinions considerable wei'-ht. The
'''Art. (192^) .
^Art.(1925)
.

9relation of '^tout to '.Yard was more tbat of disciple to master,
but he undoubtedly clarifies certain points of Ward's thought,
and his interpretation is not wholly free from criticis.u.
Certain other "brief treatments of Ward that are worthy of
mention include the section bv Rudolf Iv'etz in his A Hundred
Years of British Ph i losophy (1938), v/here Ward's psycholO!?y is
considered to be of much -Theater value than his philoso^ny, the
chapter on 'Yard b-<'- ?eter Bertocci in his The Empiric al
Arg;ument for G-od In Rec ent Bri tish Thou g:ht (1933), the sketch of
'Yard's thouczht in Arthur Kenyon Rogers's British and American
Phil ogcTDhy s inc e 1300 (1928) which gives an illuminatinr? criticism
of 'Yard's attitude to'.vard the 'Dhysical sciences, and the brief
treat'^ent of '-Yard's epistemology in Douglas Clyde Iviacintosh ' s
The Probl em of Knowledge (1915).
Of more importance than any of these writings on '.Yard are •
his own works. ~'rom the sta,ndpoint of relevance to the problem
of this dissertation, the most imr>ortant of Ward's books is The
Realm of Ends (1911), but much valuable material is also to be
found in Naturalism, and An-jiosticism (1899), Bsychol ogical
Principles (1918), and Essays in Philosophy (192?), the last
being a collection of articles published posthumously with a
memoir by Ward's dau-rhter, '.Irs, Olwen 'fard. Campbell. In addition
to these major works, there is the long and extremely valuable
series of articles wh' ch Tard ?/rote through the years for the
Encyclopaedia Britannica , f-~r j£i nd , for the Hibbert Journal, and

for various other nagazines in both England and the United
States
.
On the subject of Strong one of the best treat:nentsis that
by Charles ^.Villiam orris in his S ix Theories of Iv!i nd (1932).
After he had '.vritten this material, Morris 3ub:nitted the rnanu-
scri ot to Strong, and the latter 's coiaTients are included in the
foot-hotes. Morris clearly shows the strong organic relation
between the several aspects of Strong's thought. He feels that
Strong's metaphysics is formulated to support his epistemology
,
i^hereas the writer of f-^is dis ';ertation believes that the
episte-^olOTv is formulated to supoort the Jietaphysics . Morris's
treatment brings out the relation of Strong's thought to that of
other critical realists.
Other good material on Strong is to be found in Arthur
Kenyon Rogers's English and American Philosophy since 1 8Q0 (1938),
though this necessarily fails to take into account changes in
Strong's thought which occurred after this book was published.
Perhaps the most sympathetic and understanding interpretation of
Strong is to be found in the brief tribute paid to him after his
death bv Santayana in The Philosophy of H-eorge Santayana edited
by Paul Arthur Schilpr) (1940 ) . "ere Santayana explains Strong's
philosoDhical viewooint in the licrht of his background and en-
vironment. Of the many reviews of Strons ' s books the best are
Q T Q
undoubtedly those by Roy Wood Sellars and William P. Montague.
^Art.(1919)
.
^°Art.(1938)
.

These men show a true in9is:ht into Strong's work, and both admit
that they ha.ve "been forced to reconsider phases of their ov/n
svste-ns in the light of Strong's penetrating analysis.
As in the case of 'Vard the \vritin'^,s by Strong himself are
of more importance than anvthing v/ritten about him. His important
books are •.'.Tiy the Mind Has a Body (1903), The Ori gin o f Con-
sciousness (1918), A Theory of Knowledge (1923), Kssays on the
Natural Oricrin of Zind (1930), and a Cr eed for S ceptics (1936).
A special problem, concerning these works of Strong has to do with
the chaneres in his philo^^ophical viewpoint, both in his episte-
mology a.nl his metaphysics. Strong himself often attempts to
solve this difficulty by reviewing his philosoohical development.
Yet the difficulty is increased by the fact that, in the opinion
of this writer, Strong's latest writings do not revea,l his best
thinkinPT. His intellectual development probably reached its
peak in the Origin of Consci ousness . Though he remained an acute
thinker, and though he may have made certain points more explicit
and changed his mind about others, he never seems to have
written with quite as much vigor again. This is borne out by
the fact that the Qri g:in of Consciousness was his last unified
book of any length. A The or^'- of 5'nowledo:e is verv brief, and
the T^ssays and A Creed for Sceptics are parti v collections of
articles. For the purposes of this dissertation, moreover, The
Orio-g n of '"'ons c iousness is most important because in it his view
of the mind-stuff theory is made most explicit. Like Ward,
Strong has to his credit a long list of articles published chiefly

in Mind, the Philosophical Review, and the Journal of Philosophy .
The sources for study of the historical tackground of pan-
psychism include first of all the classic treatment of animism
by Edward B. Tylor in his Primitive Culture (I871), the support
of Tylor 's position by lYillia:i IkiacD^ouscall in his B ody and Mind
(1911), and the challenf?:e of this classical view of animism pre-
sented t-r Dr. Ruth Benedict in her articles in the Encyclopaedia
of the Soci al Sciences (1930), and in Franz Boas's G-eneral
Anthropology (1938). The sources of the investis;ation of hylo-
zoism include Aristotle's treatment of the Ionian physicists in
De Anima
, t'^e pre-Socratic fragments found in John Burnet's
Early '^^re ek -hilos oohy. Attention is paid to the difference of
interpretation of hylozoism between Burnet and Leon Robin. For
panpsychist Ic elements in the philoso^-^hi es of A.verro^s, Nicolaus
of Cusa, and Paracelsus reliance is place in such secondary
sources as the histories of philosophy by Ueberweg, '.^indelband,
Erdmann, Thilly, V/eber, and W.K. Wright. The available works of
Leibniz are all examined together with the interpretations by
H. Wildon Garr in his book entitled Leihniz (1929) and bv Bertrand
Russell in 'r^os Critical 'Exposition of the Philos ophy of L eibniz
(1900). The Ethics of Spinoza are examined because of Spinoza's
influence upon those who came to hold the mind-stuff theory.
Fechner's panpsychism is most clearly presented in his El em ente
der Psychophysik (i860). The English translation of the passages
cited is by William MacDougall . William K. Clifford in his

Lec tures and Essays presents the first and in some respects the
"best statement of the mind-stuff theory.
In addition to the naterial on or "by Ward and Strong and
the sources of the historical background, as much other litera-
ture on metaphysics as possible has been consulted with special
emphasis on recent works having some relation to panpsychism or
to the mind-body problem or both. The scope of this reading may
be found in the bibliography.
5. Method of Procedure
The discussions of the problem, the organization, and the
previous studies in this field have to a large extent already
indicated the method of procedure. An exposition of the points
in the historical background and in the systems of Ward and
Strong which are specifically related to our problem is combined
with an attempted internal and external criticism of these factors
Special attention is given to the method used by these thinkers
and to hov; consistently these methods are carried out. To this
end the relation of the em.pirical to the formally logical in the
thought of Ward and Strong is especially examined. For example,
in a certain phase of his thinking Strong insisted upon rigorous
use of the analytic method, carrying his analysis of osychic
states well beyond the empirical evidence. Yet he possessed
enough respect for the empirical factor not to follow the
analysis to its logical limits and hence arrive at neutral

entities. He insisted that the analysis should go beyond what
v/as empirically Justifiable yet not so far as was lo!T,ically
justifiable. Hence he seems to have arrived at a purely arbi-
trary compromise between the two in his mind-stuff . This point
V7ill be elaborated in its proper setting in the chapter on
Strong. It is c^ted here merely to show that our emphasis will
be first of all on internal criticism, searching for Incoherent
factors within the systems themselves. The question of the rela-
tive adequacy or Inadequacy of other system.s of metaphysics, the
central Doint of external criticism, thou-^h it is important,
will be considered secondary to the more internal type of
approach. Comr)arison of systems will be limited la,rgely to the
relation of the two major systems within panpsychism itself as
represented by Ward and Strong.
As has been indicated this dissertation is interested in
Tard and Strong primarily as representatives of the m.onadistic
and mind-stuff theories. Hence v;e shall give most attention to
the works of Ward and Strong which present their best exposition
of t^ese ideas.

CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKG-ROUND OF PANPSYCHISM
1. Primitive Animism
The origin of a concept has frequently little if anything
to do with the truth of that concept. The lowly oria:ins of
the doctrine of immortality, obscured as they are by savage
superstitions, cannot legitimately he used as an argunient
against the truth of survival after death. Neither can the
truth of panpsychisra he attacked on the ground that it was
anticipated to so-^.e degree by the humbler doctrine of primitive
animism. The fact that primitive man conceived the objects of
the physical world to be animated and controlled by spirits is
irrelevant to the truth of the view that physical nature is
composed of centers of elementary aT/areness.
The great importance of primitive animism has been recog-
nized by modern anthropologists, one of the first authoritative
treatments of the subject being that of Edward B. Tylor."^ This
belief in spiritual beings probably dates from oaleolithic
times, and its distribution and influence give it a place v/ith
2
such factors as the invention of fire. According to Tylor,
the theory of Animism divides into two great dogmas,
forming parts of one consistent doctrine: first, con-
cerning souls of individual creatures, capable of
'Cf. Tylor, PC, I, 417-502; II, 1-361.
^Benedict, Art. (1930), 65.

continued existence after death or destruction of the
hody: seconc^, concerninp; other spirits upward to the
rank of powerful deiti es , . . .Aninism in its full develop-
ment . includes the belief in souls and in a future
state, in ccntrollin??; deities and subordinate spirits,
these doctrines practically resulting in some kind of
active worship.^
Tylor held aniniism to be a rational belief based upon inferences
from dreams and visions combined with observations of sleep,
trance, and death. In this view he is supported by Il.cDougall,
who contends that "in their main outlines Dr. Tylor 's account
of the ghost-soul and his theory of the genesis of the idea
seem to remain unshaken."^
This view has, however, been effectively criticized
by Dr. Ruth Benedict, who points out that animism is not so
much the result of a rational concept as of primitive man's
total reaction to his situation. Thus primitive man naively
fails to distinguish bet?/een the anim.ate and inanimate orders.
The division of the world into animate and inanimate
with acconpanying appropriate behaviors for each is
alien to folk custom even among ourselves and has to
be learned by each generation of our children....
Throughout man's history it has been the mechanistic
theory of the universe that he has found fantastic,
not the animistic one. He is equipped with a con-
sciousness of his ov/n purposes and motivations, but
no stretch of the imagination is sufficient to give
him a conception of the workings of inanimate life.
His experience of his own inner life he uses to
picture to him.self those other sequences of which he
has no such knowledge.
Tylor, PC, I, 426-42?.
Tylor, PC, I, 428-452.
'MtDougall, ?!B, 4.
'Benedict, .Art. (1938), 636.

This view of animism as the result of man's failure to recoc;-
nize a distinction "between these tv/o orders reveals a more
adequate understanding of the primitive mentality than does the
rationalistic view of Tylor. Furthermore a question raised in
this discussion 6f animism will prove to "be of great signifi-
cance in the later trea.tment of panpsychism; namely, whether
or not the distinction "between these two orders is a valid
one, whether any sharp line may be drawn "between a realm of
conscious "beings and one of unconscious physical objects.
2. Kylozolsm
Historically and perhaps also logically, next In the
development toward a panpsychistic metaphysics lies the theory
of hylozoism. This term is derived from the G-reekc'^^? (matter)
andiwyf (life). This is '"the doctrine which endows matter with
an original and inherent life and conceives life and spiritual
process in genera.l as a property of matter."'^ Kylozolsm
differs in several significant respects from animism. The
former did not grow as a superstitious belief held uncritically
by a group of primitive men. Rather hylozoism was consciously
formulated by Individual thinkers and hence was more precisely
defined. It is definitely a philosophy, Independent of
religion as animism was not. Probably also the spiritual
process in hylozoism is more immanent than that in animism.
The ghost spirit of animism might temporarily inhabit a body
or physical ob ject^ whereas the s'r-^iritual factor of hylozoism
7
Armstrong, Art. (1902), 489.

forms more the inherent nature of the object.
Yet ^though hylozoism is more a product of reason than is
animism, it is questionable whether the former, like the latter,
does not after all rest upon the failure to distinguish
between an animate and inanimate order. Accordincr to Burnet,
in the da^'-s of Thales, and even far later, the dis-
tinction bet'veen matter and spirit had not been felt,
still less f ormulated. . . .The uncreated indestructible
realitv of whic'^ these thinkers tell us was a body,
or even matter, if we choose to call it so; but it was
not matterpin the sense in which matter is on^osed
to spirit.
°
Though this factor is recognized by Robin, he contends that it
is irrelevant.
It does not matter that in Thales' time, m.en were
still unable to distinguish between matter and mind.
That his doctrine was a protest against the common
experience which contrasts life with the apparent
inertia of matter is sufficient ground for calling
it a form of Hylozoism."
The theory of hylozoism was thus first represented by
the Ionian physicists. According to Aristotle, "certain
thinkers say that soul is intermingled in the whole universe,
and it is perhaps for that reason that Thales came to the
opinion that all things are full of l-ods.*'''^ It is noteworthy
that the arguments which Aristotle brings against this hylo-
zoism closely resemble those brought against modern pan-
psychism by its opponents. Though such later presocratic
Burnet, SGP, 15.
Robin, OT, 38,
'Pe Anima
,
4lla7.

thinkers as Heraclitus and Esipedocles went viell beyond the
ideas
, of the Ionian physicists, their work apparently pre-
supposed a type of hylozoism . "^"^ Thilly finds evidences of
hylozoism as late as the Stoics. "Their metaphysics is the
Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy translated back into Hylo-
zoism."-^^
3. Early Vitalism
i. Averro^s . The next important contributions toward
the development of panpsychism are to be found in mediaeval
philosophy. In this line of development the nane of. Averrofes
(1126-1198) has co-ne to be included primarily because certain
phases of his thought are referred to by Windelband as
panpsychistic .^^ Far from the more coTirnonly accepted use of
the term, 'A'indelband is here talking about the relation of the
'
one universal active Intellect to individual minds. Ueberweg
describes this relation as follows:
/_Averro^s assumed/ that there was only one active
intellect in the world and that man had only the
'di3^;:osition ' in virtue of which he could be affected
by the active intellect; when the active intellect
came in contact with this disposition there arose
in us the passive or material intellect; the one
active intellect becoming on its entrance into the
plurality of souls particularized in them Jus-^ as
lia;ht is decomposed into the different colors in
bodies ... .Averro^s did not identify this universal
mind... with the Deity himself, but conceived it... as
^-'-Cf. lomperz, G-T, I, 66, 245.
^^Thilly, HP, 108.
^^windelband, HP, 340.
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an e^nanation from the Deity.
The chief ai-n of Averro^s was, of course, adequately to inter-
pret Aristotle. The influence of Neoplatonism and of his own
''ohammedan religion upon his thinking kept him from fully
achieving this goal. Yet despite this, his denial of indi-
vidual immortality showed him to he a more accurate student of
Aristotle's philosophy than were his contemporaries, the
scholastics
.
Though the so-called panpsychism of Averro^s has to do
mainly with the relation of the universal mind to the mind of
the human individual, it was considerations resulting from
this problem of Individuation that led two later thinkers,
Nicolaus of Cusa and Paracelsus^ to a position much closer to
that of modern panpsvchism.
ii« '^I colaus of Cusa . The thought of Nicolaus of Cusa
(1401-1464) is especially Interesting in that James Ward himself
recognizes in it the seeds of later theories of monads. In
1
6
his view that each entity mirrored the universe and that
each individual thing possessed a uniqueness impossible to
17duplicate TTicolaus anticipated Leibniz, but in his theory
that "every being preserves its existence by virtue of its
14
Ueberweg, HP, I, 4l6.
-"^'Tard, RE, 64.
Ueberweg, HP, II, 24. •
^'^Windelband, HP, 34?.
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comiunity with all others" he seens to point more to the inter-
actin'7 monads of 'Yard than to the windovvless 'Tionads of Leibniz.
A certain infinitey. . .helonf^s likewise to each indi-
vidual thinP!, in the sense that in the characteristics
of its essence it carries within itself also the charac-
teristics of all other individuals .... In this way
every individual contains within itself the universe,
though in a limited foru peculiar to this individual
alone and differing; from all others. -^^
Thus the relation of the individual to the universe is that of
microcosT! to ."nacrocosm , the former mirrorin?' the latter. Since
20
G-od is present in each individual thing, the system of Nicolaus
leads to a pantheism which he vainly attempts to avoid.
The fe r-r eachin^^ implications of t^-^e system, of "'icolaus
are clearlv pointed out h-"- ?/.K. '.Yright.
He almost seemed, to anticipate Kant when he says that
attention and discrimin-: tion are present in sense
pare "':;t ion, and that time and^ space are products of the
understanding and therefore inferior to the mind that
produces them. He sounds egelian when he asserts that
what seemtto our reason to he opposites rea ly coincide
in a higher unity. At times he thinks of led 'as the
creator of a Viorid external to Him in orthodox mediaeval
fashion; at other times he tends to "bring ilod and the
world more closely together in a manner anticips.tory of
Spinoza. T/hen he 8.f firms that each individual thing is
infinite in its own way and mirrors f*re universe fr^rji
its o?m point of view, he is suggestive of Leibniz.
iii. Paracelsus . ~]ot to he omitted from these precursors
of panpsychism is the nam.e of Theophrastus v"n --"ohenheim, more
comTiOnlv called Paracelsus (1493-1541). Though he was not
^\^eberweg, HP, II, 24.
^^Windelhand
,
H^, "54?.
^^Thilly, .HP, 231.
^'^Vright, HJJ', 23-24.

entirely free from ma.r^lc and charlatanism in his practice of
medicine, his writings nevertheless reveal much of genuinely
philosophical and scientific value. He revived and elaborated
the theory of -.lacrocosm and Microcosm.
Although the doctrine of the Macrocosm and "icrocosm
was of primitive antiquity, and had even last been
emphasized by Raymond of Sabunde, who had not remained
unknown to Paracelsus, yet it Is only since and by
means of the latter that it was made the central
point of the whole of philosophy."
In his medical theory there is some anticipation of the
homeopathic doctrine. ^-^ Each thing is ruled by a vital prin-
ciple called the archeus. Disease checks the activity of this
archeus, and the physician must stimulate its functioning so as
24to overcome the retarding force.
The fundamental metaphysical presupposition of the
unity of all vital force led of itself to the thought
that there must be also a simple, most efficacious,
universal remedy for the strengthening of every
Archeus whatever, a panacea against ail diseases and
for the maintenance of all vital forces. ^5
Paracelsus' view of a self-contained universe, imbued through-
out by a vital I'.fe principle is summed up by Werkmeister as
follows
:
In Paracelsus' world-view transcendent factors and
forces gradually disappeared, and all creative
elements, nay, ilfe-givlng spirit itself, he found
in the things about him. The dual is ;n of form and
matter, of substance and force, he denied; and out of
'^^Srdmann, HP, I, 613.
^^Cf. Ueberweg, HP, II, 24.
24
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cause and effect he wove an intricate pattern of
pulsating, throbblns!; life, a universe that was suf-
ficient unto itself, that was for.'ii and matter in one,
and evolved its law and order from within. "
4. Early Fanpsychism
i. Leibniz . The first thinker to fornulate an explicit
panpsychism was G-ottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). The
central concept of Leibniz is that of force, or the capacity
27
of action. Since activity is to be found only in mind, the
structure of reality must be mental. Leibniz defines substance
28in terms of force. The real world is composed of individual
centers of awareness and force which are called monads. These
are "the true atoms of nature, and, in fact, the Elements of
things. "^^
Substance is a being capable of action. It is simple
or compound. Simple substance is that which has no
parts. Compound substance is the collection of simple
substances or m onads . "'onas is a G-reek v;ord which sig-
nifies unity, or that which is one.
Com-nounds, or bodies, are multitudes; and simple sub-
stances, lives, souls, spirits are unities. And there
must be simple substances evervwhere, because v/ithout
simple substances there would be no compQunds: and
consequently all nature is full of life,^^
From the standpoint of natural processes the monad is in-
destructible. "The ilonad can begin only through creation and
^^Werkmeister, ?S
, 7.
^'^Cf. Carr, LEI, 86.
28
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end only through annihilation. Composites, however, begin or
31
end gradually . "-^^ The monads are completely self-contained
and unaffected "by contact with other monads. As Leibniz puts
it, "The /^.onads have no ?7indows through v/hich anything may
32
corae In or go out.' The monads range in type from a very low
grade to the very highest I.!onad of Monads, which is G-od. The
created monads may be classified into three groups: first,
bare monads with extremely dim and confused 'petites percep -
t i ons ' analogous to a human being's state of dizziness or
33dreamless sleep ; second, souls v;ith a certain amount of
34
memory, feeling, and attention ; and third, spirits .which in-
clude reflective self-consciousness
,
reason, and a capacity
35for knowledge of eternal and necessary truths.
These three types of monads are not sharply divided but
rather merge into each other. All three types are constantly
undergoing internal change motivated by desire or ar^petition,
36the constant striving to attain new and clearer perceptions.-^
All three types mirror the entire created universe, but the
spirits transcend the two lower groups In their mirroring of
A'-on .
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G-od as well. Spirits alone participate in the moral order
-z O
known as the city of Ci-od. Every monad, whatever its grade,
possesses individuality, each differing frorn every other and
39
each mirrorinp; the universe "according to its own fashion.'
Yet though this individuality endures in all monads, only the
spirits possess what could be called personal immortality
since only they poo's ess memory of self.
The immortality v/hich is required in morals and in
religion does not consist merely in this perpetual
existence, which pertains to all substances, for if
in addition there were no remembrance of v/hat one
^in
had been, immortality would not be at all desirable.
G-od has so orda^.ned everything that spirits not only
shall live forever, because this is unavoidable, but
that they shall also preserve forever their moral
quality, so that his city may never lose a person,
quite in the same way that a person never loses a
substance
.
The Supreme ionad deals with the monads which He has created
in two ways. Toward the bare monads and souls which compose
the rea.lm of nature, he acts as an architect or mechanic;
toward the spirits he acts as monarch. Thus there results
the division expressed in the title of one of Leibniz's essays,
The Principl es of Nature and of G-race .
Since the monads are windowless, their relations toward
each other are directed and controlled by a principle known as
^'^Mon.
,
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pre-established harmony. This principle is especially useful
in acccunting for the mind-body relation. The mind of a man
is a hip;h grade monad or spirit; his body is composed of many
bare monads. In the case of animals the relation is between
a soul and the bare monads composing the body.
It is evident, then, that every living body has a
dominating entelechy, which in animals is the soul.
The parts, hovever, of this living body are full of
other living beings, plants and animals, v/hich in
turn,, have each one its entelechv or dominating
soul
His d.issatisfacti on with the dualism of Descartes, with the
occasionalism of G-eulincx, and with the psycho-phjrsical
parallelism of -pinoza was prob.^bly a most important' motive
in Leibniz's formulation of his system. By interpreting all
rea,lity as psychical, he had eliminated qualitative dualism.
Py his doctrine of monads he had maintained quantitative
pluralism, thus preserving the value and independence of the
individual. Yet the problem facing all such atomic systems
is that of relating the units in such a v/ay as to ac c-ount for
the unity found in nature, and especially to explain the rela-
tion betvreen mind and bodv. This is the problem which the
doctrine of ore-established harmony was designed to solve. It
v;as supposed to show how the monads, which could not consciously
interact, could act together as a composite being.
The soul follows its own laws and the body has its
laws. They are fitted to each other in virtue of
the ore-established harmony between all substances,
42.
.'lon .
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since they are all representative of one and the same
universe .-^
In order to clarify this doctrine Leibniz follows the analogy
of tv;o clocks which m* =cht be nade to ac^ree by mutual influence
of one clock upon the other, by constant efforts of the clock
maker, or by their o?m accuracy. Pu^tins: the soul and the
body 'n place of the tv/o clocks, he examines the three theories
as follov/s.
The way of influence is that of the comT.on philosophy;
but as we cannot conceive of material particles or
properties or immaterial qualities which can pass from
one of these substances into the other, we are obliged
to abandon this view. The way of assistance is that
of the syster. of occasional ca.uses; but I hol5 that
this is making a Deu s ex :.!achina intervene in a
natural and ordinary matter, vfhen, according to reason,
he ought not to intervene except in the manner in
which he cobperates in all the other affairs of
nature.
Thus, there remains my Hypothesis; that is, the
way of harm.ony preestablished by a prevenient divine
contrivance, which from, the beginning has formed
each of these substances in a way so perfect, and
regulated with so much accuracy, that merely by
following laws of its own, received with its being,
it nevertheless agrees with the ot-^er, lust as if
there were mutual influence, or as if Hod in addition
to his general coBperation constantly put his hand
thereto.
Leibniz considered the doctrine of pre-established
harmony to be the greatest achievement of his system. "He
loved to call himself the author of the system of the pre-
established harmony." He especially stressed its advantages
43
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over occasi onalis'D. To him one original miracle seemed prererabxe
to a constant series of divine interventions. "The harmony, or
correspondence between the soul ancl the "body, is not a perpetual
miracle, but the effect or consequence of an oric^'nal -'iracle
worked out at the creation of things." Yet actually his re-
jection of occasionalism seems rather perfunctory. It is
quest icnabV-^ -r-- Leibniz ever fullv considered the hypothesis
of a- continuously v^orkin.^ immanent 1-od. By occasionalis.T; he
T!ay mean only the :5.octrine of a '3-od
,
existing apart from the
y/orld and interfering in its affairs on all occasions when it
is nec^ssar-"- to maintain the appearance of parallelism and of a
moral order.
'.Then Leibniz spea/KS of pre-established harmony as having
been worked out at the creation of thin^:s , he introduces another
problem. If all monads have existed since a sin.'^rle time of
creation, wha.t is t' " itatus of the individual soul or spirit
before the birth of the individual animal or man of which it is
destined to becomes the entelechy? To explain this Leibniz
relies uoon the theory of preformation h^^ld by the embryoloc'-i sts
of his day.
The or^ranic bodies of nature .. .alwa\'-s come from, seeds
in Thic h there y/as without doubt some preformaction,
^and hence/ it has been decided that not only is the
organic body alreadv present before conce'^ition, but
also that a soul, in a word, the animal itself, is also
in f-^is body; anil it has been decided that, by means of
conception the animal is disposed for a great transfor-
mation, so as to become an animal of another species. We
can see cases somewhat similar outside of generation when
<3;rubs become
46Fourth Letter to Clar're, para. 89.

flies and caterpillars become butterflies.
Now that the theory of preformation has been superseded by
that of epif^enesis, Leibniz could not find support in the same
kind of embryolo:;^y
.
Leibniz supported his theory of preformation by
reference to the microscopic embryoloc^v of his day.
It is, however, sufficiently evident that he could
not account for the equal influence of both parents.
When this is taken into account, v/e lose the simpli-
city of the one dominant monad, but we get a theory
uncommonly like '.Veissmanr{_s continuity of the germ-
plasm. A fev/ years 8,zo
,
therefore, we mi^^ht have
referred to Leibniz as anticipating; the latest re-
sult=5 of modern science: but since the fall of
Weissmann, vm must deny outse].ves this pleasure.
Probably the best support of the theor\' of pre-established
harmony lies in the view that
each monad always represents t"ne whole universe, and
therefore the states of all monads at every instant
correspond in that it is the same universe they rep-
resent.... It is evident that the monads, if each of
them m.irrors the present state of the universe, nec-
essarily keep pace with one another. °
Thus, though the monad never perceives an '.'thing outside it-
self, it gains knowledge through its mirroring of the universe.
The clearer this mirroring is, the more adequate perception
it v/ill have, especially of its own nature and that of its
immediate environm.ent . 'A'hatever m.ay be said concerning the
weaknesses of the theory of pre-established harmony, it is to
be questioned whether any system of monads is as self-consistent
''''^Mon.
,
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without its inclusion. This problem will arise especially
with ^Vard.
In the formulation of his system Leibniz relied upon the
Investigation of conscious experience, especially immediate
experience. When, fory^xample, he describes the nature of the
bare monads, he draws uo:n the experiences of indistinct per-
ceptions at times of faintins;, dizziness, and dreamless sleep.
The nature of the real he found in his ovm mental processes.
The importance of this subjectivist ap 'roach is e'-phasized by
Whitehead in the following words.
He ^eibniz/ approached the problem of cosmology
from the subjective side, whereas Lucretius and
Newton approach it from the objective point of view.
Thev implicitly ask the question, That does the
world of atoms look like to an intellect surveying
it? '.That would such an intellect sav about the
spectacle of an atomic universe? .. .But Leibniz answered
another question. He explained what it mus^^ be like
to be an atom. Lucretius tells us what an atom looks
like to others, and Lglbniz tells us how an atom is
feelini^ about itself.''
This empirical ao.r^roach is basic to panpsychism, and in fact
to some extent to all forms of idealism.
Several basic principles underlie the system of Leibniz.
He emphasi-^es the law of identity and the law of contradiction.
"The first of the truths of reason is, as Aristotle rightly
observed, the principle of contradiction or, what amounts to
the same thing, of identity. "^^ Second only to the law of
SOUon
.
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contradiction Leibniz places the principle of sufficient
reason
.
Our reasonin^:^ is based upon two great principles:
first, that of Contradiction, .. .and second, the
principle of Sufficient 'Reason, in virtue of v/bich
we believe t^s.t no fact can be real or existing and
no statement true unless it has a sufficient reason
why it should be thus and not otherwise, "'ore
frequently, however, these reasons cannot be known
by us
.
The attempt to a';^ply the principle of sufficient reason in-
volves consideration of lod. "It is thus that the ultimate
reason for thin'2:s must be a necessary substance, in which the
detail of the changes shall be present .Tierelv potentially, as
in the fountain-head, and this substance we call G-od.
Another principle to which Leibniz attached very great
importance was that of continuity. "It is one of my great
maxims, and one of the -est verified, that nature never makes
leaps. "-^-^ Though there may be something to be said for the
continuity of time and syi^ace, continuity in the series of sub-
stances seems to be supported by little concrete evidence.
According to Bertrand Russell,
why Leibniz held that substances form a continuous
series it is dif'^icult to say. He never, so far as
I know, offers a shadow of a reason, except t'^at such
a world seems to him pleasanter than one with gaps.-'
If there was I'ttle reason to hold to the DrinclDle of continui
S3-,
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In Leibniz's day, there is even less today. The general
principle that nothino: in nature occurs in leaps is contra-
dicted by t^e occurrence of mutations and by the evidence
from quantum '-echan^cs. Yet this principle has been empha-
sized by many panpsvchists in t-'-eir protest a£7;ainst any break
between the nature of the orfzanic and the inorp;anic realms.
The unique individuality which Leibniz attributes to each
monad rests upon the principle of the identity of indiscernibles
Concerning this Leibniz says
There are not in nat are two real, absolute beings
indiscernible from each other; because if there were,
G-od and nature would act without reason, in ordering
the one otherwise than the other; and that therefpre
G-od does net produce two pieces of matter perfectly
equal and alike. ^'
This too is a principle held by many other panpsychists
.
ii, Fechner. A somewhat differ^^nt type of panpsychism
was form.ulated by G-ustav Theodor Fechner (I8OI-I887). SDinoza
had introduced t'^e double-aspect theory which
he derived from h*s def^_nitions of substance as "that which is
Tn itself and is conceived through itself, "^^ of attribute as
"that v/hich the intellect perceives as the essence of sub-
stance,"^^ and of mode as "the modifications of substance, or
that v/hich exists in, and is perceived through something other
57
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than itself. "^^ For Spinoza the only substance is fTod,^-^
a being possessinp- infinite attributes, two of which are
extension and thought .^'^ Thus the hunia.n mind and human body
are modifications of these inf-^nite attributes of extension
and thought in G-od. Yet it is important to note that ex-
tension and thought and hence the human mind and the human
body are but tv;o aspects of the same substance.
Substa.nce thinking and substance extended are one
and the same substance, comprehended now through one
attribute, now through the other. So also the mode
of extension and the idea of that mode are onp.and
the same thing, though expressed in two ways.'-'
From this, according to Spinoza, it follows that "body cannot
determine mind to think, neither can mind determine body to
motion or rest or any state different from these, if such there
be." Thus these two aspects of the same mode -merely run
parallel to each other. Looked upon through subjective
introspection the mode apoears as conscious mind; looked upon
through an inspection of its physical properties, this same
mode Y/ill appear as body. "The object of the idea constituting
the human mind is the body, in other v/ords a certain mode of
^^Eth.
,
?t. I, Def. iv.
^^Eth., Pt. I, Prop. 14.
^^Eth., Pt. I, Def. vi; Pt . I, Prop, xi
.
^^Eth., Pt. II, Props, i-ii.
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,
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extension which actually exists and nothinsr, else.'
This douhle-asrect theory of mind and body has been
adopted "by the school of panpsychism founded by Fechner and
interpreted in a somev/hat different way. Instead of being
one of s.n infinite number of attributes, mind becomes for
them the central factor, the intrinsic characteristic of the
substance. Thus mind and body are indeed two aspects of the
same factor, but the factor is not a third substance but rather
mind itself. Thus the brain is the same thing as the mind.
The difference lies in the point of view of the investigator,
whether he is using the senses or s elf-cons c i ousnes s .^''^
Fechner, who first set forth this view, illustrated it
as follows.
ATien anyone stands inside a sphere its convex side is
for him quite hidden by the concave surface; con-
versely when he stands outside, the concave surface
is h-i,dden bv the convex. Both sides belong together
as inseparably as the nsychical and bodily sides of
the human being, and_ these also may by way of simile
(
v
ergleich sweise ) be re?rardel as inner and outer sides;
but it is just as impossible to see both sides of a
circle from a standpoint in the plane of the circle,
as to see these two sides of humanity from a standpoint
in the plane of human existence.
Again Fechner states the position even more explicitly. "What
appears to you who yourself are SDirit, when at the inner
standDoint as s-oirit, ap'cears from the outer standpoint as
^^Eth., Pt. II, Prop. xiii.
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the iDodily substratum of this spirit. It 69 Thus, according to
Fechner, no spirit can 'lave an Immediate perception of another
70
spirit, but must roly upon its apparent corporeality.
Fechner carried his doctrine beyond the mind-body
relation of human persons. Like most panpsychists he developed
an atomism. Yet his psychic atoms differed from those of
Leibniz in that they could form not only a part of the body of
a higher being but actually part of his mind. This, of course,
followed from his theory of the identity of mind and body.
Thus not onlv are men centers of consciousness composed of
psychic atoms, but also the world, the other planets and all
oxes-t physical bodies are animated by conscious spirits.
Fechner does not wish his atomism... to be confounded
with monad olo!<y, with which, on the contrary, it engages
in a life-anl-deat struggle. His atoms are just
the simplest phenomena, and therefore what exists in
consciousness, i.e. in the consciousness of Crod, and
thus of all ... Fechner says that his view stands in a
relation of complels antagonism to one view only,
namely monadology. ' •
Fechner was the acknowledged precursor of those thinkers
who hold the mind-stuff or mind-dust theory. Undoubtedly the
greatest problem faced bv Fechner as by all 'raind-stuffists
'
is the explanation of the unit^'- of consciousness. In the
system of Leibniz an organism was centered around soul or
spirit which was itself one high grade monad. The unity of
69Fechner, E^, I, Introduction.
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consciousness was accounted for by the unit-; of this sinf7;le
mcnad. Yet in the systeiP. of Fechner there is no counterpart
to such a central source of unity. Here the body is not con-
posed of a lower type of monads: the body is merely another
aspect of the mind. The mind is not one monad but an a?^gregate
of psychic atoms. Actually Fechner attempted not to explain
but to deny the unit^^ of conscious ex^-^erience . In this he
set t'-'.e course for later adherents of the mind -stuff theory.
In his doctrine of psycho-physical continuity and discontinuity
he finds the explanation of mental unitv in the spatial
proximity of the corporeal attributes of mind. Thus he points
out that "the psychical! y unitarv and simple are resultants
of a physical manifold, the physical m.ultiplicity gives
unitary or simple resultants . "'^^ Such an explanation would
allow no element of necessity in this apparent unity, but
this Fechner v/illin:^ly admits. His study of the earthworm had
convinced him. each ganglion had its own separate consciousness,
and from this he had inferred the existence of separate
streams of consciousness in the higner vertebrates.
He held that empirical facts justified the view that
if the hum.an cerebrum could be divided by the knife
into two halves, each half would enjoy its separate
consciousness; and that, if the brains of two men c^uld
be effectively joined by a bridge of nervous matter,
as t>ie two halves of the hum.an cerebrum are joined by
the cor'ous call osum
,
the two men would have a single
common consciousness. It seemed, then, to him that
a cond.^tion of the unity of consciousness is continuity
'^^Fechner, EP, II, 526.

in space of the nervous matter .... The further and
essential condition of the running tof^ether of lesser
consciousnesses to for"!! the larger consciousness of
the individual is, Fechner 3up;p;estB , that their
material aspects shall fornn a spatially continuous
systeTi, every part of wh^ ch in its psvchical aspect
rises above„the 'threshold of consciousness' of that
individual
.
'/iTiile the evidence fro'n cases of multiple personality is
insufficient to support such a view as Fechner advocates,
while the difficulties of the concept of compounding individual
consciousnesses into larger wholes are extrenely great, and,
while the concept of the 'threshold of consciousness' seems
self -refutin?;?* it must also be said that Fechner was more
ready to follow out logical implications of his theory than
any holder of the double aspect theory or mind stuff theory
since his time.
^i^* Clifford . The double aspect or identity theory of
mind and bodv together with psychic ato'nism v/as further
developed by 'filliam K. Clifford (1345-1879)?^^ It was he who
first popularized the notion of mind stuff as the basic element
of which the peal world is composed. Clifford's epistemology
is worthy of note. The objective order of the space-time world
as investigated bv physical science is, he believes,
a group of my feeling, which persists as a group in
a certain manner: for I am at present considering
onlv the objective order of my feelings. The object,
then, is a set of changes in my consciousness, and
not anything out of it.... The inferences of physical
MacDougall, BM, 294-295.
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'•^
"The conception of the 'threshold', which is fundamental
to Fechner's \Yhole paycho-y^hysical scheme and especially to the
doctrine of psycho-physical continuity, re:p.ains utterly obscure,
a metaphor of extreme va:q;ueness merely. The phrase 'threshold
cf consciousness' p6s,^esses a misleading plausibility which ha,s
secured for it a wide popularity. The consciousness, it is
assumed, exists whether a ove or below the 'threshold', and its
being above the 'threshold' is merely the condition of its
a-^gre-j-ation in the complex whole of individual consciousness.
The 'threshold', above which consciousness is said to rise, must
be then in every ca?.e the 'threshold' peculiar to the individual
whose consciousness is in question; yet (accordin-^ to the
doctrine) this individual has no existence as such apart from
the 'threshold'; the 'threshold' is in short constitutive of
the individual. It must, I think, be admitted that a 'threshold'
pure and simple, regarded as the bond that holds consciousness
tO!3;ether, is in no way superior, rather vastly inferior to the
cone ;tion of a soul as a unitary being" ( MacDougall
,
EM, 296).
'^ Clifford took the view chiefly from I7undt (cf . Clifford,
LE, 286). Yet ?/undt ' s master, Fechner, wa^ as has been shown,
the true source of the idea. Accordin'7 to :.'acDouga.ll , "we ov/e
to him fechner/ the first statement and the most elaborate
defense of it'TSr/i, 137).

science are all inferences of ny real or Dossible
feelinpcs; Inferences of something actually or
potentially in my consciousness, 'not of anvthino; out-
side it
However, a kno^vledge of o-^:her minds he puts on a different
basis. Unlike the objects of the physical order, these other
minds are independent of the conscious experience of the
individual
.
The inferred existence of your feelinp^s, of objective
groupings among then similar to those among mv
feeling and of a subjective order in many respects
a.nalogous to my ovm, --these inferred existences are
in the very act of inference ti^j?own out of my con-
sciousness, recognized as outside of it, as not
being a part of me. I procose, accordingly, to call
these inferred existences ejects
.
things "^thr own out of
my consciousness, to distinguish them fro:n o^pjects,
things presented in my conscious phenomena.'^
It is furthermore this recognition of ejects as independent
of my consciousness that has led men to believe that objects
also are external to their consciousness. Ejective facts
or chan(2;es in consciousness run parallel to objective facts
or changes in the brain. There is no causal relation between
these two factors. '^'^ Following Hume's method of analysis
Clifford reaches the conclusion that
as your consciousness is made up of elementary
feelings grouped together in various ways {ejective
facts)
,
so a part of the action of your brain is made
up of more elementary actions in parts of it grouped
'^^lifford, LE, 274-275.
'^^Clifford, LE, 275-
'^^Cf. Clifford, LE, 277.
77
Cl^_ ff ord, LE, 279.

together in the game ways (objective facts).
From this Clifford reasons that such elementary feelings
can exist independently.
A feeling can exist by itself without forming part
of a consciousness. It does not depend for its
existence on the consciousness of which it may form
a part. Hence a feeling (or an e.j ect-ele-nent) is
Ding-an-sich , an absolute whose existence is not
relative to anything else.'^
Clifford attempts to explain the union of these elementary
feelings into a single consciousness just as Fechner had
done by the soatial association of their ohysical counterparts.
i
These eject-elements which correspond to motions of
m.atter, are connected together in their sequence and
coexistence by counterparts of the ohysical laws of
matter. For otherwise the correspondence could not
be kept up. That elem.ent of v/hich. . . even the
simolegt feelins is a comolex I shall call .Yind-
Stuff.°°
He sums up his doctrine by saying that "matter is a mental
O-j
picture in which mind-stuff is the thing represented," and
that "reason, intelli^-ence , and volition are properties of a
complex which is made up of elemer^,s themselves not rational,
not intelligent, not conscious."
The resemblances between Fechner 's views on the mind-body
relation and on the nature of reality and the views of Clifford
stand out plainly enough. Yet, unlike Fechner, Clifford does
"^^Cliff ord. LF, 282.
'''^Clifford, LF, 284.
"^^Cliff ord. LF, 284.
^'Clifford, LE, 286.

not believe in lod. Thoun^h the Din.'? an s lch is mental it is
not related to a Suprene :.:ind. Clifford bitterly assails the
organized reli3;ions of his day.
I can find no evidence that seriously militates against
the rule that the priest is at all times and all places
the enemy of a:^ 1 men.... If there is one lesson which
hi?5tory forces upon us in every page, it is this: Keep
your children away from the priest, or he v/ill Tiake
them enemies of mankind. It is not the Catholic clergy
and those like them who are to be dreaded in this
matter; even the representatives of apparently harmless
religions may do incalculabj| mischief if they get
education into their hands.
Clifford's humanistic ideas are vrell expressed in the following
words
.
A helper of men, outside of humanity, the truth will
not allow us to see. The aim and shadowy outlines of
the superhu:iian deity fade slowly ay/ay from before us;
and as the mist of his presence' floats aside, we per-
ceive with a greater and greater clearness the shape
of a yet grander and nobler figure- -of Him who made
all CrOds and shall unmake them.^^
The modern panpsychists have in general follo7/ed some
variation of Leibnizian monadism or of the mind stuff theory.
For the most Dart the former group has followed Leibniz in
holding to tneism, while the latter group has tended toward
the atheistic humanism of Clifford. This will be seen to have
been true of Ward and Strong.
82
83
Clifford, LE, 362-333.
Clifford, LE, 386.
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CHAPTER III
CONTEllPOHARY STATUS OF PANPSYCHISM
1. Panpsychism and Realism
That type of panpsychism which has its basis in the
mind stuff theory has been held by certain modern realists,
including Charles A. Strong and Durant Drake. It has even
been looked upon with some favor by such a neo-reaiist as
William P. MontaT;ue, who clarifies his position as follows:
Panpsychism really connotes two distinct theories:
(l) the positive viev/ that all matter has something
psychical about it; (2) the negative view that all
m?tLer is nothing but psychical. "Jith the first of
these views I am in entire sympathy. It is only
against the second or negative doctrine that I shall
argue.
The neo-realiJ?t ' s concept of neutral entities would keep him
from admitting that matter is nothing but psychical, yet
Montas-ue's continued interest in and sympathy toward panpsychism
is clearly broucrht out in his more recent work, The Ways of
Thinp;s , where he even acknovv'l edges the possibility that
Eddingtcn's type of panpsychism may be the correct view.
Strong, one 'of -tfee 'twor American critical realists to
accept panpsychism, give'i the fullest development of the
realistic type. Ris work will be examined more fully in a
''Montague, Art. (1912),
2
Montague, 'VT, 293-294.
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later chapter. Drake's view differs little from Strons's.
There are, however, other realists whose systems contain at
least elements of panpsychism . C. Lloyd Morgan's concept of
emergent evolution possesses stron'^ resembla.nces to pan-
psychism. For example, he remarks that
the whole physical system from bottom to top is also
from top to bottom a psychica,l system. Of this total
psychical system in its entirety the emergent quality
of mind is high-level only; but all lov;er levels are
psychi call}/- as well as physically involved.^
If Whitehead be considered a realist and if the mental pole
of his actual entity be sufficiently emphasized, he also may
be placed in this class, though it should be noted that his
atoms are monads rather than 'stuff,' and that his later
writings have shovm an increasingly idealistic trend of
thought. The panpsy chistic element in ^Whitehead's thought is
revealed in t^e followin-^: passage.
In its self-creation the actual entity is guided by
its ideal of itself as individual satisfaction and as
transcient creator. The enjoyment of this ideal is
the 'subjective aim.' by reason of which the actual
entity is a determinate process.
This subjective aim is not primarily intellectual;
it is the lure for feeling. This lure for feeling
is the germ of mind. Here I am using the term 'mind'
to mean the complex of mental operations in the
constitution of an actual entity.
4
Whitehead, who was form.erly more of a realist than he
now is, forms a good point of transition from tho realistic
to the idealistic type of panpsychis .i . It may be said of the
Morgan, EE, 194.
'Whitehead, ?R, 130.

realists who hold panpaychism that in most cases they have
teen driven to it by their inability to explain experience in
materialistic terms. Recent developments in physics have made
it impossible for the realist to remain a materialist. Even
Roy "tVood Cellars must now refer to himself as "a reformed
materialist."^ As, therefore, the realist faces the situation
honestly, he finds it necessary to reinterpret matter so as
to take into account the recent developments in quantum and
wave mechanics. If in addition to these iDhysical data he
takes into account the factor of mind, he may move toward the
idealistic position. Yet since he is un7/illing to go all the
way with the idealist, he may find in so^ne type of t-e mind-
stuff theory a convenient stopping place where he may hold to
many of the characteristics of 'matter' with ju«t enous;h of
'mind' thrown in to save his position from complete un-
tenability. '.Vhi le some thinkers have wal / ed this road and
others aopear to have made a start in that direction, it
should be pointed out that Strons; 's journey was in the
opposite direction. Ke started as more of an idealist and
became gradually more realistic until he reached the compromise
of the mind- stuff theory.
2. Panpsychism and Idealism
Panpsychism is so much an idealistic hypothesis that some
5
Sellars, /.rt.(l94l), 424.
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writers are inclined to limit the term solely to its idealistic
form, and exclude the nind-stuff theorv from clas -lification
under panpsychism. For example, Ledger '.'7ood has recently de-
fined panpsychism as "a form of metaphysical idealism, of which
Leibniz's theory of monads is the classical example, according
to v;hich the v;hole of nature consists of psychic centers
similar to the human mind." Such a definition v/ould, of
course, exclude Clifford and his realistic followers. Yet
since some of these have consistently referred to themselves
as panpsychists and have done much to popularize the term,
their elimination seems unwarranted. Suffice it to say that
the Leibnizian monadic theory is the older tradition in a
panpsychism which includes "both s-roups.
The idealistic type of panpsychism v/ill, of course, place
more em.phasis on time and less on space than ^ill the realistic-
7type. The idealistic type generally finds the unitv of con-
sciousness in a single monad or psychic center rather than in
an aggregate of psychic atoms held together by the spatial
connection of their physical correlates. The idealistic pan-
psychist will, therefore, favor interaction over the double-aspdct
theory. The idealistic panpsychist may be either a
quantitative pluralist such as IVard or an absolutist such as
Miss Calkins or Hartshorne. On first thought it mip-ht be asked
^In Runes,
,
223. See Ch. I, above.
'^Cf. Hartshorne, PH, 174-175.

hov/ an absolutist could explain the individuality of the
psychic entities if they are only Darts of the absolute, but
actually it would seem little harder to explain the apparent
individuality of lower monads or cells than it would be to
explain the apparent individuality of human minds.
Virtually all idealistic panpsychists believe in a G-od;
:aost of them are theists; v/hereas most realistic pan-
psychists, as has been pointed out, follow the atheism of
Clifford. To many idealistic panpsychists G-od takes the form
of a Supreme ilonad or Cell. For Whitehead, who is closer in
this respect to the idealistic panpsychists, God is the
primordial actual entity com.posed like all other actual
entities of a physical pole, a mental pole, and a super jective
Q
nature. Similarly for Stace
G-od is a cell, or a super-cell. And by a super-cell
I mean onl^' a cell of '^ireat mao-nitude in rep:ard both
to the data and its consciousness. But the structure
of God is the same as that of any other cell. He is
composed of consciousness and private data. His
omniscience will mean that to every actual datum in
every other cell in the universe, and to every
possible datum in its world-gattern , there corresponds
in His cell an actual datum.
Panpsychism and idealism fit together more naturally than
do panpsychism and realism. Idealism has always emphasized
consciousness, maintainins that it held the clew to the nature
of reality. Panpsychism has done likewise, specifically
^IVhitehead, PR, 134-135.
^Stace, NW, 252-253.

centering consciousness or feelinn; in Individual units.
Realistic panpsychism is at best a comproniise, which hardly
does more than add certain mental characteristics to '.natter'.
3, Panpsychism as a Solution to the Tvlind-body Problem
^' Panpsvchism and interaction. Panpsychism 'arose as,
pferhaps more than anythincr else, an attempt to soive the mlnd-
boly problem. As has already been mentioned the type of
relation between mind-^and body most commonly accepted by the
monadistic type of panpsychism is ' nteraction. P'or Leibniz
the interaction between monads, if it may properly be called
that, was determined by pre-established harmony. The monads
of 'Vard interacted by means of what he called 'sympathetic
rapport '
,
a term borrowed from Lotze and sip^nifyinp; a kind
of immediate contact between monads. "^"^ Panpsychists who hold
to interaction betv/een mind and body base their belief on
empirical evidence, and since both interacting units are of
the nature of mind, there seems to be no insurmountable m^eta-
physical obstacle to accepting this explanation. In the words
of ^tace,
Nothing is inconceivable save what is logically
contradictory, and interaction involves no contra-
diction. It is no longer plausible to declare a
priori from an armchsAr that something in nature is
'impossible' because it outrages some prejudice of
ours. No a priori argument against interaction has
the s'^ ightest weight. Experience is the only
''^Cf. Ward, RE, 256-257-

arbiter. And experience leaves no doubt tliat inter-
action occurs.
The argument most frequently brought a.zainst interaction
between nind and body has to do with the law of the conservation
of energy. This argument may be stated as follows:
Mind cannot act on body without giving rise, in body,
to a gain or loss of energy, which is not balanced
by an equivalent loss or gain, "^ut no gain or loss
of bodily energy is discoverable which is not
balanced by an equivalent loss o^ gain. Therefore
mind cannot act on body at all.
Perhaps the best refutation of t'lis argument is given by CD.
Broad, who concludes his statement as follows.
The argument from energy has no tendency to disprove
two-sided Interaction. It has gained a spurious
authority from the august name of the Conservation
of Energy. But this impressive principle proves to
have nothing to do with the case. And the real
"oremise of the argum,ent is not self-evident, and is
not universally true even in purely intra-physical
transactions .
^
ii. Panpsychism and aut om.atism . The theory of interaction
just discussed reco-^nized a mutual influence of mind and body
upon each other. The theory of automatism holds to a complete
determination of mind bv bod^^ with no influence of mind upon
body. According to this view, "consciousness is always caused
by the brain, entirely determined in its nature by the brain,
and in its turn never determines or influences anything,
whether bodily activity or further mental content . ""^'^ Though
11Stace, N'.V, 69.
12Stout, 87.
13.
Broad
,
•"TN, 109.
14.Pratt, PR, 233.

such a view mav not be lo<3;icallv self -contradictory , it pos-
sesses some ratber fatal wea'messes. If consciousness is
totally inefficient, why shoul'3 it ever have apoeared in the
process of evolution?
If thouQ;hts are connected with each other only in-
directly thj:'ouf5h the processes of matter and physical
energy, it is difficult to see how there can be such
a thina: as lo^z;ical necessity, or even the establish-
ment of reasonable orobability. '.Ve should thus be
co:npelled to think as we do not because one hypothesis
is a more reasonable conclusion from the facts and
premises than another, but because the physical laws
that hold in the ner.'-ous system produce this hypothesis
and not that. ^
In any case there will be no possibility of a panpsychist '
s
ever accepting? t^-is theory of raind-body relation. His doctrine
is one which emphasizes rather than discredits the importance
ahd- causal efficacy of consciousness.
iii. Fan'osv ch i sm and parallelism . Interaction involved
a causal relation between mind and body and in turn between
body and mind. In automatism the causal relation went from
body to mi"d only. "arciLlelism allows for no causal relation
whatever from mind to body or from body to mind. These two
factors merely run parallel to each other, the series of events
in the one having a corresponding^, series in the other. However
the parallelist, if he is a thinker, finds it necessary to
look beyond this descri-^tion for an exolanation. for these two
series of events running parallel to each other. What is the
reason for such a correspondence? As has been shown in
15.
Pratt, ^R, 25S-239.
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an?-lyzinpr, the views of Fechner* and Clifford, the panpsychiat
who recof^nizes such a'oparent pr'.ral lelism explains it by inter-
preting conscious mind and physical "brain as identical, the
mind bein^ what is perceived, through introspective s elf -conscious-
ness and the brain what is perceived through the senses.
Apparently this fits in v/ell enoup;h v/ith the panpsychisrn of
mind-stuff theory, since for any panpsychist the psychical
entities .Tust admittedly possess a physical appearance. The
difficulties of such a. theory will be examined when Strong's
treatment of the mind.-body problem is discussed.

CHAPTER IV
FACTORS aOMCN TO THE THOUG-HT OF WARD AND STRONG
1. The Psychological Approach
Both Ward and Strong began their teaching careers as
psychologists. The work which first made Ward famous was his
article on Psychology for the Sncyclo'oaedia
_
Britannica
published in 1S95« It was he who perhaps more than any other
individual changed the English psychological emphasis from
structural to functional. Some authorities consider his work
in psychology to have constituted a greater contribution than
his work in philosophy."^ However that may be, his efforts in
philosophy have been undertaken from the psychological approach
In this connection he remarks that
epistemology and ethics, the theory of knov/ledge and
the theorv of conduct raise questions v/hich depend
in large measure for their solution on the con-
clusions we reach concerning this problem ^of v/hat
constitute^ the true standpoint and scope of
psychology;/. In the history of British thought, in
particular, the influence of the conception of
psychology on metaphysical and ethical speculation
is unusually striking.
Especially noteworthy here is Ward's definition of psychology
which is given in the following passages:
Psychology cannot be defined by reference to a special
suc,1ect matter as such concrete sciences, for example.
'"Cf. \-.etz, HYBP,
2
?;ard, ?P, 1.

as mineral opry and "botany can be; and yet, since it
deals in some sort with the whole of experience, it is
obviously not^an abstract science in an-<' ordinary sense
of thp.t term. ^
Psycholo-^y th'en vie define as the science of individual
ex''cerience--understan2in.T, bv experience not -nerely, not
primarily, cocrnition, but also, and above all, conative
activit"^^ or behaviour.
Such a definition of psvcholo-y is one which mi^rht well drive
its author beyond the commonly accepted limits of that science.
In fact, in '.Yard's n;reat book, Principl es of Psy cholog. y, there
are references to epistemology
,
axiolof^y, a-nd even metaphysics
v/hich would not appear in a present-day text-book on psycholofj;y.
This may be partly accounted for by the fact that psycholo?ry
and philosophy had not become as clearly separated in Ward's
day as thev ha-^^e todav. ''Nevertheless it remains that ^Yard went
from psychological em.phasis to a philosophical one and that his
chief metaphysical speculations at least were the work of his
later years. Thus when he attacked a problem of epistemolo'^y
or of m.ind-body relation he had at his disposal a wealth of
psycholo.^rical data which could be used as evidence. he could
likewise correlate these with the data of toiolo-ry of ,7hich he
vYas also a thorou?<h student. Yet though "Yard's psychology was
not v/ithout its physiolo^.ical emphasis, this failed to influence
his thinkin'-- v-f^ :^.irection of materialism as it did Strong's.
Strong also is psycholOQ:ical in his approach. Ke was for
a time professor of psycholo'^'y at Columbia University. h'e too
ex-oressei dissatisfaction with tVie general tren:: of modern
^Vard, "^P, 26.
Sard, F^, 28.
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psjrchology. In 1930 he wrote that
psycholop'.y
,
despite the vast amount of excellent v/ork
that has been done, remains as respects theory in a
state of confusion because its fundamental conceptions
are not clear. It is still, as Williams James said
manycyears a-'p, not a science but only the hope of
one.
The hope for improvement in psychology lies, Strong believes,
in a greater physiological emphasis.
The hope of psychology ever becoming a science lies
in its keeping in close touch with neurology. The
structure of the nervous system must supply the
ground-plan of the mind, its functions must furnish
the key to the mind's activities. It is impossible
to understand the mind aright by cont em^plating it
from within.
Like Tard Strong is not only interested in psychology as such
but in relating it to problems of epistem.ology and metaphysics,
^is works all deal more with these latter two fields than
v/ith psychology, though there is constant reference to
psychological data. For example, Strong expresses his satis-
faction that his theory of awareness "permits us to reconcile
completely the psychological relation betv/een ideas, which
must be causal, with the logical relations which are necessary
to their conveying truth."
Whatever may be t>^e differences between the psychology of
''/ard and Strong, it is significant that both constantly
emphasize it and use its data in the formulation of philosophical
theories. It mav be considered imoortant also that the two
^Strong, EN?.:, 4-5.
"^ENM, 221.

out3tandin<5 pariDsychists of their day both approached philos-
ophy throu£2;h psycholosiy.
2. The Emphasis upon Evolution
Thous;h their interpretation of it is quite different,
"both Ward and Strong give a prominent place in their systems
to the factor of evolution. For his part Ward strongly
stresses the principle of epigenesis and shov/s its difference
from the earlier preformation theory.
The so-called evolution of the world is really epi-
genesis, creative synthesis; it implies continual
new herrinnings , the result of the mutual conflict
and cooperation of agents, all of whom, thousrh in'
varying degrees, act spontaneously or freely.
The whole is more than the sum of its parts--that is
the cardinal characteristic of evolution as under-
stood hv the pluralist. A unity that is not more
than its constituent elements is no real unity at
all: it is only a formal or mathematical whole. All
real synthesis entails new properties which its com-
ponent factors in their previous isolation did not
possess .9
In one place 'Yard appears to accept the over-optimistic idea
that evolutior ' im.olies progressive advance.
"Stability and progression," he remarks, "are correlative
conditions of psychical as they are of all other, evolution.
Though Strong may presuppose the change from preformation
to eoigenesis, he does not emphasize it. The conclusion which
Ward draws from ^t would hardly be compatible with his system,
which has no place for such a unity of consciousness, but
..10
^lYard, RE, 271-272.
^Ward, RE, 101-102.
""^Ward, PP, 415.

rather seeks to deny it. Strong's interest in evolution is
to shov/ that "a psychic ego can come by evolution only out of
would hold good for any type of evolution v/-ether it involve
preformation, epigenesis, mutations, or emergents. Neverthe-
less this idea is sharply questioned by "Aorris Cohen and his
point is certainly worth noting.
Evolutions who accept the principle of continuity
without qualification believe that since conscious
life appears in the course of cosmic history it
must have been latent in the cosmic dust or nebula
from the beginning. If this latency is anything
more than the bare fact ths.t what happened v/as pos-
sible, this argument has force only to those who do
not believe that real novelty or nevi combinations'
can appear in time--a view which goes back to the
original eighteenth century form, of evolution, as
exfoliation of that which was ori -finally involved
or folded up. Eut the theory of epigenesis which
replaced it in bioljpgy might replace it also in
general philosophy .-'^
In spite of Cohen's contention, it appears from a passage
13
already cited that C. Lloyd I'iorgan at least would deny the
emergence of a psvchical entity from something not itself
psychical
.
If anything the thought of Strong seems more dominated
by the concept of evolution, than is that of ^Tard. In Strong's
case it sometimes appears doubtful v/hether he is using the
tbeorv of m.ind-stuff to explain evolution or whether he is
using evolution to support the theory of mina-SLuff.
a psychic world. II 11 It seens probable that this statement
11
StrongO J OC, 322.
12
Cohen, RN
,
306.
13

3. Rejection of :;;uali tative Dualism
Both 'Yard and Strong reject qualitative .netaphysical
dualiS'H, this rejection being of course an essential element
in panpsychism. Ward launches out vigorously against any sue!
dualism:
This whole distinct ion of pheno^nenon and ©piphenomenon
is hut the old ^tory of the Cartesian dualism, over
again. But after puzzling the world for nearly three
centuries, it seeiis--at least as a philosophical
tenet--in a fair wa^ to disappear. j.iake two mutually
exclusive halves out of one concrete v/orld: in the
one you will find only your own so-called subjective
states and have to "become a solipsist; in the other
the organisms you would fi»ji^ there you could call
onlv automata at the best.
Metaphysical dualism Ward believes to be responsible for many
problems and difficulties, two of which he emphasizes in the
following words.
These two problems--the relation of body and mind
and the reality of external perce:-^t i on--have con-
tinued to vex philosophic thinkers from Descartes'
day down to our own, nor will thev cease to trouble
us till dualism is laid to rest.^
In Naturalism and Ag^nosticis m Ward devotes the greater part
of one volume to the refutation of dualism. One of the most
interesting thinp-s in t^is treatment is his account of how
such dualism arose.
The naive dualism of ordinary thought and language
was traced to the union of naive realism based on
the notion of the transsub jective, with the hypo-
thesis of introjection or animism. .. .As scientific
14
Ward, RE, ?.
^^Ward, P?, 12.

knowledge and philosophic reflection advanced this
naive dualism led on to a further dualism of the
supirical and the rational, such as we finil, for
example, in the Cartesian T^hilosophy and its develop-
ment.
As part of his attack on dualism, Ward makes a very "brilliant
assault upon the ilea of substance. '':e refers to this cate-
gory of substantiality as, "before all others... the stronghold
of Cartesian, nay, of all, dualism . ""^'^
?hat
,
then, is the source and the validity of this
conception of an unchangeable substratum as applied
to things? All that we knov/ of anything resolves
into chanr^es that it produces in other .things or
undergoes through them.... The changes which consti-
tute the whole of our direct experience of things
can... in no way be explained by this bare poten-
tiality of everything and actuality of nothing. -^^
As will be brought out in more detail in a later chapter,
Ward opposed to dualism a spiritualistic monism of a pan-
psychistic type.
Strong also rejects dualism, making mind-stuff the sole
20basic reality. But unlike Ward he uses t-e concept of sub-
stance. '.That for '.Tard was the chief enemy of monism, becomes
for Strong its leading support.
If phenomenalism is in error, its opposite, the re-
cognition of a real thing distinct from a sense-datum
but apprehended in that form is the truth. This is
what has always been meant in philosophy by substance;
'"Sard, NA, II, 182.
'^'^'!Iard, MA, II, 192.
1 8
Ward, NA, II, 192-193.
'strong, 00, 14, 322.
'^ard, RE, 13, 6?.
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and the best na-^.e for the ant i-phen -menal.l stic view
is (not Realism, which is ambi.ccuoua but) substan-
tialis-n.
Stronc; sroes on to complain of the extreme difficulty of winning
anvone to his position.
If it is an uphill task to convince philosophers of
the reality of substance, what is to be said of the
enterprise of proving to them that feelings are not
necessarily as they appear to be? This is a labour
truly Herculean. HegWjho essays it has need indeed of
the physical method.
4. Acceptance of Quantitative Pluralism
Though both 'A'ard and Strong reject qualitative metaphysical
dualism in favor of monism, they accept quantitative pluralism.
According to ''i'ard,
it is assumed that there exists an indefinite variety
of selves, some Indefinitely higher, some indefinitely
lower than ourselves. But even the highest if there
be a his^-^est, will, it is assumed, be only primus
inter pares, one amon??: theg^sany , and not an Absolute
really/- Including them all.
Quite different fro: this plurality of selves is the
plurality of mind-stuff. In the words of Strong,
as to its distribution: mind-stuff is certainly plural,
but the problem is to specify the sense in which i't is
so. In other words, it has parts--Gince a visual
sensation or a complicated thought evidently contains
many sim.ultaneous details--and these parts have
relations between them.
As:ain Strong asks,
^^Strong, E^Tv, 22.
^^Strong, EN!1, 23.
^^7ard, RE, ^2; cf . also RE, 436-443.
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The parts of 'uind-stuff are of course separately real,
"but are they d.i3crete--are they detached from one
another and separated by Taps? Are there units of
mind-stuff, or is it a continuum? Is a mass of mind-
stuff like a shower of sparks or a heap of gold-dust,
or is it rather to be compared to a leaf of gold-foil
or a flame ?^5
Though Strong's answer is inconclusive, he does go on to say
that the search for unit-^ in the psychic state has revealed
26
"only a plurality of elements in the form of a field."
Since Strong believes in the self as a complex of mind-stuff
27
with little intrinsic unity, and since he fails to consider
the concept of a G-od, he is of course a pluralist with respect
to selves, with no possible danger of his becoming an
absolutist
.
It would be presumptuous of us /says Strong? in
dealing with so difficult a sut ject-matter , to assume
that we have got to the bottom of it and excluded
the po s si b ility of an existential unity. Eut perhaps
we will be justified in saying that, as. between
Hume's position and that of believers in a. 'simple
and indivisibleoSoul , ' the balance inclines. in favor
of the former.
Thus '''ard and Strong are pluralist^, 'et the selves com-
posing Ward's pluralism each possess a unity not to be found
in the atomistic system of Strong.
5^. The Ultimate Character of Elementary Awareness
Certainly one outstanding difficult^ faced by all pan-
25^
strong, OC, 24.
fctrong. oc. 25.
27Strong, EM:,!
, 255-273; OC, 282.
Strong, OC, 286.

psychists is the need of explaining physical nature in terms
of psychical entities. The practice of virtually all pan-
psychists^ including Ward and Strong^ is to explain this by an
analogy with elementary awareness or feeling as it is exper-
ienced by the human individual. It has already been shovm that
this was the practice used by such earlier panpsychists as
Leibniz and Clifford, and it may be asked whether there is any
more empirical way in which the problem c':^-uld be faced. These
thinkers recognize that immediate experience is the most certain
clue to the nature of the real. 'Tithin such a consciousness
they experience periods of more 'elementary av/areness ' perhaps
caused bv dizziness, stupor, or the gradual process of
awakening from a heavy sleep. Feeling is thus, they believe,
more elem^entary than full consciousness, and the psychic units
which com.pose the physical world v/ill hence be analogous to
this lov;er type of feeling.
Ward believes these lower entities to be selves. "Even
the lowest," he says, "v/ill possess whatever De Lhe irreducible
minimum essential to being in any sense a subject or self at
29
all." Speaking of this lower self, "Yard further states that
when... we imagine this com.pl exity /of the organism/
decreased without limit, we reach the concept of the
bare monad v/hose orccanism^ so to sav, reduces to a
point, and its present to a moment; which can only
react immediately and to what is immediately given.
In other words such monads deal only with their en-
vironment and, so long, that is, as they remain bare
monads, they severally deal with it alv/ays in the
^%E, 52.

30same v/ay.
Thus for '.Vard the very simplest psychical units possess in
the simplest possible form the characteristics of the more
complex self. Though these bare monads compose the environ-
ment of the hlc^her self, they never become a part of that
higher self.
Strong, too, finds tine nature of the physical world in
feelin,Q:; or sentience, "-'et he carries the process of analysis
much farther. Instead of having simple entities merely
forming the environm.ent for more complex entities, he holds
that the simple entities, which are much simpler than .'.Yard ' s
bare monads, actually form a part of the complex ones. This
is because, though Strong uses the same introspective method
that 'i/ard uses, the former believes that feelings, or the
elements that go to make up feelings, can exist independently
31
of other aspects of the self. Thus instead of a y^orld of
nature made up of minute selves Strong conceives of a world
made up of psychical elements capable of becoming the parts
of selves.- It is noteworthy, however, that the psychical
elem.ents of Strong have apparently the same 'dimensions' as the
bare monads of '"ard. Strong refers to them as "units of
energy or sentience in points at instants."
^°RE, 257.
•^'•Cf. Strong, OC, 306-30?.
^^Cf. Strong, OC, 317-322.
^^Strong, ENOM,

It is of scne importance that .Yard and Strong both
admit the fact that their concept of physical nature as made
up of psychical entities goes far beyond the evidence of
introspective experience. According to 'Yard,
The naked, slumbering monads of Leibniz, the monads
whose so-called perception is absolutely confused
or undifferentiated, are. as much an abstract ideal
as the mass-TDoints of th physicist, ^^ody v/ithout
extension and a sub.iect without consciousness are
limiting concepts, not known realities within ex-
perience.-^
For Strong's part he states that
To assert that any unanalyzed feeling does in fact
consist of such parts is indeed to go beyond the
evidence of introspection. That is, it is to go
beyond what introspection of the unanalyzed feeling
itself has told us, and apply to it what we have
learned from introspection of the analyzed. But this
is perfectly legitimate. We act no otherwise v/hen,
looking through a microscope, we ascribe retrospec-
tively to the object the characters which the micro-
scope reveals. -^^
In general it may be remarked that the differences between
Tfard and Strong correspond quite closelv to those between
Leibniz and. Clifford.
"Ward, !^E, 195-
'strong, OC, 30?.

CHAPTER V
CHAEIACTERISTIC FACTORS OF STRONCr'S PANPSYCHISM
1. Fundamental Character of Introspection
Some of the more important views of Strong, especially
those held in common v/ith Ward, have already been set forth.
A more systematic treatment of Strong's system will now be
attempted. Ivlention has already been made of his emphasis upon
introspection, but this cannot be stressed too stronsrly, since
it is a key to his entire system. One instance was cited
where Strong urged that greater attention be paid to the
physiolorrical side of psychology. Nevertheless one reason
for this was his belief tha.t "study of the nervous processes
accompanying awareness of our feelings may throw light on the
nature of the introspection."^ Again he makes the claim that
"introspection may be held to be approximately adequate know-
ledge." In fact his whole conception of the nature of the
real comes avov/edly from introspection. This is revealed in
the following tribute to the adequacy of introspection.
Truth of s;reater philosophical value is to be derived
fro-^ the consideration that, as we have been evolved
out of the lower organisms and they presumably out of
inorganic m.atter, these humbler existences must have
fundamentally the same nature as ourselves, I'^.Tiat this
^ENOM, 6.
^OC, 231.

nature is, 1?=^ revealed to us introspection. For
we have everv reason to suppose introspection adequate
not only as respects the specific details of its
objects, but also as respects their general nature--
what we have called 'the psychic character.' By this
I mean that which all psychic states have in common...
Since the objects of introspection. . .are existences,
not mere qualities, and since this is what they have
in common, the psychic character must be that by which
they exist, and, if all thin.3;s in the v7orld have
ultimately the same nature, then they too m.ust be
psychic .-5
2. Identification of G-ivenness with Consciousness
For Strong givenness, awareness, and consciousness have
the same meaning. He explains it thus:
For us to be aware of a thing is for the thing to be
given--these are a sinccle relation viewed from
op"::osite ends. Put as the fact that things are given
is the least disputable of all the aspects of con-
sciousness, I propose... to speak of awareness as
' s-ivenness '
.
One reason for Stron^: 's em.phatic rejection of materialism
and neo-realism is that in the idea that all existences are
either physical or neutral there is forgotten "the fact that
all exoeriences , in order to be such, have to be given, and
It
^
that an excerience v/hich is not given is not an experience. -
Thus "consciousness is the function by which things are
given." Strong stresses the idea that givenness is not a
Stroncr
,
OC
,
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datum of experience. "In being aware of thinp;s v/e are /not/
aware also of our awareness of them--we are aware exclusively
of the things."'^ Because givenness is always to some person
it is conceived bv Strong as an external relation. What is
o
given is not an existence but only an essence or appearance.
The fact that the essence rather than the existence is
given makes Strong an epistemological dualist and gives him a
means of accounting for error in perception which the neo-
realists lack.
However, there is met a difficulty in interpreting Strong
caused by one of his rather frequent
changes of view. Thus with respect to the data of perception
he writes in 1920 as follov/s:
The question will be whether a datum can be so con-
crete as even to have a sensible vividness, and yet
not be an existence, but only an entirely concrete
universal, a universal of the lowest order. This
would mean that the same datum exactly might be
given to another person, or to the same person at a
different time and place; in such v/ise that the
datum would not be in time and space. That the data
of perception are in fact universals of this des-
cri'^tion is the thesis of this "oaper, and what has
been meant by calling them, essences."
In 1931, eleven vears later. Strong expresses a change of view
on this subject.
I used to regard the ssnse datum as an 'essence'
or universal; but I have changed my mind about this.
T now think it is a particular, occurring only vvhen
'^Strong, OC, 36-37.
^Strong, OC, 78.
^Strong, Art. (1920), 231-232.
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it is intuited; that it depends for its te'aporary
"being on the intuition of it, and therefore does not
exist independently or continuously; that thouf!;,h not
in' space and time, it is yet hound down to certain
places and ti^nes; that it is a phantasm or apparent,
generated by the activity of the self. ^
This chancre, though Strong makes a good deal of it himself,
does not alter either his epi stemological dualis:7i or his
ahility to ac count for perceptual error. The latter in fact
may be said to be strengthened, since more weight is placed
on the fact that it results from the activity of the self
rather than directly from the existing object.
The reason wh^r Strong's changes in view are especially
likely to cause difficulties in treating his system is that
his more significant works v/ere written before these changes
occurred. Morris, in his excellent treatment of Strong, finds
his earlier books so superior to his later writings that he
bases his study almost entirely upon the former. '^"^
The identification of givenness with consciousness is
questioned bv I^.orris, who would limit consciousness to a mor^
advanced form of givenness. According to him,
it would ar^pear to be more just to say that an element
is given v/hen it is functioning or could function in
a symbolic or conscious process than to say that for
an element to be given a symbolic or conscious process
must take place. Accordingly it seem advisable not to
identify givenness and consciousness, but to regard
consciousness .. .as a more complicated form of given-
ness or thereness which involves symbols.-*-^
"^^Strong, Art. (1931), 217-218.
^^Morris, ST:.^, 217n.
"^Slorris, STM, 224.
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This would, however, be limit inn- consciousness, somewhat as
^.itehead does, to an advanced form of thou-rht , -.vhich Strong
13
calls intellection. '
In the following: treat nent the word 'essence' v/ill nec-
essarily be used in citing passages from Strong's Prig-, in of
to the nature of the datum, it is susgected tnat the term essence
ma.y well be interpreted merely as appeara^nce 7ith no reference
to ^i.^iversal . Acc jrdins to Strong, "The s.re such existences
as 'psychic states' which m.ust be distinQ:uished from. ,essences
and a,re the m.eans b""- which essences are T,iven--the vehicles of
their r-ivenness . "'^'^ The funda,me-ntal importance of psychic
states is revealed by the li,3;ht thev throw upon the nature of
the self. Strong points out
(l) that all psvchic states, if not actually existent
within a boiy, are at least inseparably bound up with
it--since if certain bodily processes fail to go on
they cease to exist; (2) that the only psvchic states
which I can m.yself experience are those bound up with
my own body, a.nil that these are in some peculiar sense
mine; (3) not only so, but that if all my psychic
states should cease to exist there would be an end of
me. The hypothesis which seems to m:e best to explain
these facts is th-t psychic states are states of the
psvche or self. --^
He makes it clear that "a psychic state," then, is only another
l6
expression for "the osvche in a certain state."
3. The Psychic State as Vehicle of 3-ivenness
Consci ousness
,
In the light of Strong s changed view v/ith respect
13
-'CC, 118.
14,Strong, CC, 79.
Stronp:, O:, 103-104.
16oStrong, OC, 105-

This does not mean that the states are one thin.'; and
the self another, and that the two are externa-lly at-
tached, as •.ve sometimes awkwardly conceive attributes
and the thing of which they are attributes to be a.ttached
...."'ater cannot exist except in some state, either
boil ins or merely fluid or frozen. In Just the same wa^
the psyche cannot exist except as composed of sensations,
feeling, desires ... .The self, in a word, is a changing
thing, now in one state, now in another, and in order
to think of it truly we must think not of an impossible
self in the abstract but of a self in a certain state,
a self concretely characterized.-^'
jiCtuallv the psychic character may be defined as "the character
that all psychic states, sensations, mental imao-es, pleasure and
r)ain, emotions, desires have in common.' Attention is "the
osychical fact oar excellence- -the vor-"- essence of v/hat we mean
b^'- a-^^ychical fact.""^^ It is important to "^tronf^'s theorv
that
the psychic state by itself is not conscious (any
more tha.n it is given to consciousness) ; it is con-
scious only qua used as a symbol— only as a vehicle of
an attention. '.Yhat we really mean by 'consciousness'
is this relating of symbolism as exercised by a
psychic state.
In view of this vehicula.r theory of psychic states,
certain additional facts of the nature of consciousness may be
considered. l-ivenness or consciousness may be described as
"simply the m.ea.nin-T or intent '.vhich the sensation acquired
21through becoming in fact the index of the obiect." One of
'"'^Stron?., OC, 104.
Strong
,
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Stronp;'s main object is, as we have ae?n, the explanation of
how mind could have riginated out of the physical world in a
natural manner. The vehicular theory, he believes, aids him
in achieving this objective.
(rivenness then is not a supernatural power, but only
a natural implication of the function of the sensation
in guidiner adjustment. It Is as such a natural im-
plicate, on that the vehicular theory may fairly be held,
despite its ultimateness , to have explained its origin.
"Nothin<3: then prevents us from sup -osing, . . that external thing
are in their intimate being of the same nature as the psyche."
It is the consideration of the nature of psychic states also
which leads Strong to his extremely atomistic view of reality.
In 30 far as isolated centers of psychic life exist,
and they certainly exist in immense numbers, reality
must be plural, it must consist of separate though
doubtless closely connected parts. Again in so far
as m.any distinct sensations or psychic elements co-
exist v/ithin each center, reality must be still
further divided up."
This concept of a vehicle of knowledge has been held in
various forms by critical realists and others. Morris points
out clearly the several types of this theory. According to
him,
Three major types of analysis are possible: (1) The
vehicle might be a part or component of the physical
world (which of course Includes the organism) ( Dewey)
...(2) The vehicle might be intrinsically mental, and
so not a component of the physical world. It may,
130.
125.
127.
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however, be (a) the mental aspect or side of the same
world which has also a physical asoect or side, whether
the double-aspect view be held in an unrestricted
fashion (' 'organ, Strong, Drake) or be limited to the
brain or some portion of the brain (Sellars), or (b)
Neither a part nor an aspect of the physical world,
still remaining a mental existent (Love'^oy) . The
vehicle might be neutral, in the sense of being
neither intrinsically mental nor a component of the
physical '.vorld. While so neutral it could be (a) a
particular (Bpoad) or (b) a universal or essence
( Santayana) .
In abandoning the concept of the datum as a universal essence,
Strong removed his system to some extent from the sphere of
critical realism. It may be significant that in his later
writings, A Theory of lOi ov/ledge (1923),, Essays on the Natural
Origin of the Allnd (1930), and A Creed for Sceptics ('1936),
though his thought may not be greatly different, he largely
drops the terminology of 'vehicle', 'psychic states', and even
' crivenness ' . It seems possible that this may be a further
indication of a growinff separation betv/een the thought of the
other American critical realists and that of Strong.
Actually the entire vehicular theory as presented by
Strong is open to serious question. Morris points to
a peculiar circularity in the argument for the
existence of psychic states. These states, supposed
to be discovered by introspection, are actue.lly pre-
supposed in order to render the introspection trust-
worthy, since the identity in nature between the
vehicle and the object known is the ground for the
confidence in the validity of introspection. Actually
psychic states are simply postulated on the ground that
they are necessary to account for givenness, and if
givenness could be otherwise explained, the^necessity
for postulatins: such states would be lost.
'Morris, STM, 215-216.
'Morris, ST:'.v, 222.

There Is sone question whether the nonTiven psychic states
of -'tronp; are adequate to exolain c!;ivenness as he conceives
it. Also, as has already been Indicated, the identification
of all a:ivenness v/ith co'^sciousness may "be open to some
question, the point at issue being whether .^ivenness is
vehicular and whether the simplest form of givenness is iden-
27tical with consciousness. '
4. The Identity Theory of Mind and Body
Strong holds the position that mind and body are but two
aspects of the same realitv, the mind or self being the object
of introsir^ection and the bodv the object of sense perception.
The histor-'' of this double-aspect theory from Spinoza through
Fechner and Clifford has already been traced.
The mind-body problem has been a, factor to '^h^ch Strong
has devoted much attention. His first important book, 3hy
the Mind has a Eody , was a careful and rather exhaustive
treatment of this subject from a m.ore idealistic standpoint
than t^hat of any of his. subsevCiuent works
.
Though even in that day (1903) he held to the identity theory,
the physical aspect he believed to be merely phenomenal , the
mental aspect being the real. He even refers to the theory
as psychophysical idealism, describing it in the follov/ing
words
:
^Then t^e. para"! lelism of mental an^l physical events is
^'^Cf. ^ orris, STM, 223.
il
metaphysically interpreted, no real paral] eliam
remains ... .Psychophys ical idealis-n is thus, at bottom,
a doctrine of identity rather than of parallelism.
If realizes intelligibly the postulate of one reality
with two aspects set up but not realized by psycho-
physical monism, -^y makins:, the physical series merely
phenomenal, it does away completely with the absurd
dependence of the mental on the physical asserted by
psychophysical materialism, while acknowledgin,^ the
undeniable dependence of the mind on the other realities
which with it appear as the body. Subordinating the
physical to the mental and conceiving the latter as
alone real, it accords as neither the materialistic
nor the monistic doctrine does with the fundamental
principle of all idealistic philosophy.^"
Strong has changed his metaphysical position to a considerable
extent since the writing of this statement. Yet strano-ely
enoufTh, as he has become m.ore and more of a realist, he has
at the same time approached nearer to the interactionist
theor^' of mind-body relation. Some seventeen years after he
had written the above passage, he states, in the preface to
The Origin of Cons c iousness
,
that in relation to the three
theories of interact"^ onism, parallel i p.m. , and automatism, he
would place his view as a fourth theory, rather than merely
including it as a type of the second. In this later theory
he holds that
the mental states instead of being the effects, are
the causes of the brain-events--or , to speak exactly,
the causes of the brain-events being oerceived, and
themselves the existences ( or an integral part of an
'extract' from the existences) that appear to the
senses under that form.^
Croinc: on to exr)lain this change of vievi^point, Strong mentions
mm, 345-344.
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that
at the time when my other book was written I was
aware that this fourth theory involved a reconcili-
ation of parallelism, if not with int eractionisrn , at
least with a species of interaction. For thou^rh,
according; to it, the mind, as parallelism asserts,
never acts on brain (since it is_ the existence or a
part of the existence that appears as the brain)
,
yet
on the other hand it does interact with the existences
that appear as the non-cerebral parts of the body,
and is far indeed from being inefficacious: so that
the psychic efficacy which interact ionism had at heart
is at last firmly established. Since ray book was
published, it has become clear to me that if what we
refer to is not the mind or psyche as an existence
but consciousness, i.e. the function of awareness,
then in recard to this the thesis of the conscious
automaton theorv is true, and is by our fourth theory
reconciled with the other two: consciousness (not the
datum of introspection but the function) is indeed a
passive resultant of the operation of the brain or
the existence that appears as a brain, and as inert
and inefficacious as the most advanced materialist
could desire. So that ou1r panpsychist theory actually
reconciles with one another and takes up into itself
al l three of the other causal theories--which is no _
snail recommendation for a psychophysical hypothesis.-^
One of the last statements which Stron*^. wrote on the subject
of the mind-body problem was in his little bool^ A Creed for
Scepti cs
,
published in 1936. It is somev/hat similar to the
one just quoted, vet it has it in a few illuminating remarks,
wh^ ch we shall quote.
I remain /he qq.}Jb7 to this day a parallelist and a
denier of the efficacv of consciousness. But I con-
fess that, qu^te recently, the interactionist arc;ument
caused me so"ne searchinccs of heart. 'tVhy indeed should
consciousness be there at all, if it is not useful?31
"e ?toes on in this section to say that it was his substitution
Strong, OC, 3-4.
Strong, CS, 55.

of the word 'self' for brain that gave him the clue to the
situation
.
It is not consciousness, then, that has been evolved
but cof^nition, of which consciousnesa--the presence
of phantasmal data to the self--is only the view from
within. 'That is really hapoenincr, when we are conscious
is that the self is coc^nizing a real thing, for the
sake of reactins: to it appropriately; and the datum is
only the shadow of the real thing falling on or rather
beco-ning visible to the self.... In a word, the inter-
action--f'^r there really is interaction--is not between
consciousness and the brain, but between the self and
the other -^arts of the v/orld.-'^
It is interesti"! " to note in passing that the statement
to the effect that there is interaction between the self and
the other parts of the world, if merely taken by itself, would
be perfectly compatible with the view of the mi-d-body relation
held by modern personalism. The distinction from Strong's
position is, of course, that the personalist ' s 'self' v/ould
not be identified with the brain, which is placed in the same
category with the rest of the physical v/orld, but be a unity.
It must be admitted that Strong's synthesis of these
theories of mind-body relation is extremely ingenious. In the
light of this hyoothesis it becomes clear why he so forcefully
emphasized the idea that consciousness is not a datum of ex-
oerience but rather the function bv which things are given. ^-^
In fact virtually ever-"- element both in his epistemologv and
his metaphysics is utilized in this solution of the mind-body
problem. This brings out how organic Strong's system really
32Strong, CS, 55.
33Strong, OC, 36.

i3. R'ven so seerainn:,ly minor a point as the inser)ara'bility
of intuition from intent in cognition is involved in the
formulation of the theory. Strong's view that the world of
nature is composed of the same stuff that the self is made
up of takes on an even greater importance when it is seen that
f^-is is used to 3xplaln, not only the identity of mind and
brain, hut also the interaction of the self with the remainder
of the body.
It is probably the case that the various parts of this
synthetic solution of the mind-body problem are just as
valid- and no more so than the part of Strong's system upon
which each rests. The reconciliation of interaction with
parallelism depends upon both the mind-stuff theory and the
veMcular theorv of givenness. The reconciliation of automa-
tism with the other two theories depends mainly upon the
ve^'icular theory and Strong's view of cognition as composed
"54
of intuition and intent.
Actually, when the synthetic solution to the mind-body
oroblem is considered, it is found that p.?.rallelism is the
dominant theor-"" with which both' interaction and automatism
are being reconciled. Thus the defects of parallelism or the
identity theory are virtually the same here as if ths.t theory
were unrelated to the other two. Strong may refer to it as a
fourth theory which reconciles all three, but actually it is
with parallelism, that it stands or falls.
34
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The
. double-aspect, or identity theory as
held by strong is to the effect that "the soul known through
introspection, is the same existent w'^ich when it is known
through percer^tion, ap-oears as the nervous process or as the
entire organisn." It is easy to see how such a theory comes
to be associated with panpsychisrn. The panpsvchist believes
that all realitv is ultimately psychical, yet around hin he
perceives a world of physical objects. It is only natural
for him to conclude that the psychical appears through sense
experience as the physical. Introspection reveals to him the
nature of the psychical; sense perception reveals a bodily
organism upon which the mind is in some sonse dependent. iThy
then may not these two factors be considered as two aspects
of the same thing?
Since there is no cone"', usive empirical evidence for the
idea that such an identity of min:^. as shown through intro-
spection with body as shown through sense perception doigs
exist, it is clear that this view is speculative, that it is
rather postulated to fulfil the needs of a system than as the
result of observed facts. Yet it may be questioned whether
t'nis theor-^ ^oes much farther bevond the empirical evidence
than certain other phases of panpsychisrn. Is there, for
example, any more empirical support for the existence and
functioning of the bare monad in the Leibnizian type of pan-
psychisrn than for this postulated identity between mind and
^^Strong, EM,
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body? It has been mentioned that the use of im;nediate ex-
perience as a clue to the nature of all reality is a thorou3;hly
em^iirical method. Yet when this method is carried to the limits
that it is by a holder of the identity theory, its empirical
character necessarily diminis'-.es
.
The evidences from the functional character of the brain,
for example, the capac'-ty of one ^Dart of the cerebrum to take
over the work of another i,\art which has been damaged, would
seem<^ show that correlation between the physical brain and
the conscious mind seems hard to explain on th^ basis of the
identity theory.
It seems possible that the entire hypothesis of identity
may be based on a- confused interpretation of what the relation
of mind to the organism really is.
The organism.
. .as observed by the bioloo^ist mav be
only a part of a substantival whole. >:ost readers

will admit that thev are more than the combined re-
nort of bioloo;ists woull show. It is this fact which
is at the basis of such vaQ;ue distinctions as that
between observing from the inside and from the out-
side. The point here insisted upon is that the difference
between the contents of the perspectives is a matter (f
more or less, and not the difference between the inside
and the outside { interpreted as the mental in,contrast
to the physical) of a two-sided substantive.^^
Further, it may be questioned whether there is "any warrant
given for attemotin'5 to localize the entire field of the ^,iven
as the inside of the brain or organism.' '
The whole concept that what the individual perceives
thjrou^h introspection as the mind is 'inside' what other
indiv'' duals perceive through the senses as his brain, seems
extremely crude. If the two things are different aspects of
a.n identical factor, can this really be considered genuine
parallelism?-^'^
If the self- observer and the outside observer are
only seeing different components of one and the same
substantive, no psychophysical parallelism results,
since all components are alike physical in the
se'-^p.e of being a physical substantive; 'introspection'
reveals no domain of pure consciousness; the psychical
is not destined to be an otiose accompaniment of
physical processes; and no motive is left for "neng
talizing the field of the p-iven in its entirety.
One of the clearest criticisms of this identity theory' is
made by Spaulding, who asks whether the difference between
whst appears to the senses as brain and what appears to intro-
spection as mind may not be as great as the difference between
^°I/orris, ST-, 244.
S'Ome confusion may be avoided by eliminating:'- use of the
ter:58 '^^-'^^^llelism ' to designate the double-asDect theory.
::orris, ^^T^".', 245.

what are commonly spoken of as the physical and the conscious.
The difference that is introduced hy 'provinf^' in
some way, either that what appears to be mental is
really physical, or that what appears to be physical
is really conacioua, is only one of name, provided
the character ana behuvior of 'thin^^s' is ascertained
empirically and not artifically by a priori argument.
On the other hand if by 'makina;' the apparently
physical really psychical in character, something is
introduced into the physical world that is in conflict
with empirically ascertained physical principles,
then one can no longer maintain the major premise of
Psychism, that the detailed results of empirical in-
vestigation are to be accepted on their face value,
and that the apparently fundamental difference be-
tween the Physical and the psychical is due only to
a difference in the point of viev/.^^
In part^ the validity of the identity theory depends upon
Stronsc's concept of mind-stuff which is now to be exam.ined.
5. Nature of Mnd-Stuff
The basic reality out of which all else is composed is
for Strong mind-stuff. He describes the attributes of mind-
stuff as the facts that "(l) It is in time, and (2) in space;
(3) it is capable of change; and (4) it possesses the psychic
40
character." Already in the discussion of Strong's pluralism
some of the reasons for his arrival at this view have been
observed. He uses the method of analysis much in the way in
which Hume used it. '^his analysis Strong tries to make as
emoirical a process as possible. He endeavors to show, as far
as he can, hovv feel inss are experienced as being com.posed of
^^Spaulding, NR, 269.
^CC, 318.

parts. Yet this analytic method is partly lop:ical, for when
he reaches the limit teyond which empirical investigation
cannot possibly be said to reveal further 'parts' of feelings,
he carries the process on by means of a logical extension of
the method. The unity of consciousness he emphatically
denies. Any apparent unity of consciousness he believes to
be the result of 'joint givenness ' . "And this of course being
not even a real unity, is no argument at all for an existen-
tial unity of mind."'^'^ However, Strong does find "one con-
tin<Tencv in which... the psychic state would apparently be one:
II 42
na^.ely, in case it consisted of a sincrle unanalyzed feeling.
Here again he questions whether the unity is real or only
apparent. "Are unanalyzed feelings composed of parts, or are
they not? Does analysis consist in the revelation of parts
that preexisted, or--v/e Tust always say--in the creation of
parts? He admits that such parts cannot be felt. Yet he in-
44
sists that they exist and compose the feeling. Hence, he
believes, introspective discrimination shows feelings to exist
4'S
of unfelt parts. Having reached this noint he asks whether
these unfelt parts which are discoverable may be composed of
still more minute parts which are undiscoverable . Having gone
41
^CC, 282.
42^OC, 303.
^^oc, 303.
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OC, 306.
^^oc, 308.

beyond the directly empirical, he proceeds to argue logically
that they are.
If the psychic state is such a sum and so immensely
plural, how comes it to "be taken by the introspecting
ego for a unit? ^^ere and how does the fusion take
place?... \Te are endov/ed with certain powers of dis-
crimination which permit us to separate the parts of
feelings from, each other up to a certain limit; but
beyond that limit we are po'?7erless to separate them.
These pov/ers have been given us for practical purposes
and practical purposes do not require a higher degree
of discrimination. "But where we are unable (or do
not take the trouble! to discriminate, we treat the
total datum as one.
Strong urges, however, that "there is no reason why we should
stop at V-^.e limit set by our power of introspective dis-
crimination."'^'^
Before Strong's analytical process is traced farther
toward his mind-stuff, it may well be asked why Strong has
follov/ed the couj'se which he has. What part does this suc-
cessive reduction play in his ph'losophy as a whole? "t^Tiy, if
he v/ishes to use the method of analysis to such an extent does
he not apply the lim.it of ri^ror and virror and actually carry
it on until it reaches the inevitable limit of neutral entities
The organic structure of Strong's philosophy has already been
noted, and this limited use of analysis proves to be no excep-
tion to the rule. His studv of the nervous svstOT. has led him
to a knowledge of its intricate structure. If he is to justify
his theory of the identity of mind and brain, he must explain
why so apparently simple a factor as the psychic state should
^^Strcng, OC, 310.
^'''OC, 308.

be another aspect of so extre^.ely complex a one as the brain.
It /the analysis of feelin.c' into pre-existent parts/
evidently has a direct bearina; on one of the diffi-
cult questions which the panpsychist theory of the
relation of mind and body involves, why a thin^ so
apparently simple as the psychic state should appear
under th^gform of anything so complex as the brain
process
.
The reason why Strong halts his analysis before it reaches
neutral entities is for one th^ ng his insistence that the
ultimate stuff be enough of the nature of mind to explain how
mirid evolved from it, and for another his requirement that
this stuff be subject to change, a quality not easily accounted
for in a neutral entity.
As far as Strong's analysis had been traced, it revealed
'microscopic' parts of the unfelt components of feeling. Yet
these mi.Q-ht not be uniformly alike. For Strong the final
stev, is taken when he points out that "if one goes back far
enough towards the elements of things--vve should expect parts
to be reached which are of the sam.e kind; if at least, the
world of phys-'cs is ultimately expressible in terms of a single
4Qkind of element.^
It is now possible to turn to a further examination of
Strong's mind-stuff, which h<^ claims to be "simply the psychical
as it really is."^*^ The negative characteristics which he
attributes to the mind-stuff are cuite significant. It lacks
^^Strong, CC, 303-304.
^^CC, 314.
^^OC, 317.

the functions of cop-nitio'^ and will, unity, and sensible
^1
qualities.-" The primary reason for these lacks is the fact
that t^ese characteristics are not possessed by the brain and
hence if possessed by the mind-stuff would interfere with the
c orrespond e'^ce between the two in the identity theor'^ of mind-
bodv relation. (Is it not true that Strong, is more influenced
by this problem than bv any other factor?)
A review of the positive characteristics of mind-stuff,
na ely that it is in time, that it is in space, that it is
capable of chanp;e, and that it possesses the psychic character,
reveals that the first three factors all belong to matter,
that is, m.itter as considered by the laterialist . The basic
elem.ent of Strong's metaphysics is thus virtually identical
with matter in a"^ 1 but one respect, a characteristic vaguely
referred to as the psychic character, a factor which, as v/e
have seen, completely lacks those mental factors of cognition,
will, unity, and sensible qualities. Ifhat is this magic factor
"without v/hich onr panpsychism would be merely materialism?"^-^
Stronf?;'s answer is, "^eeling--not necessarily 'felt' or intro-
spected feelino:— is on the panps^.'-chist theory the substance of
the ego, and by conseouence the substance of the world out of
w'-lcn tne e-ro originated . "^'^ At length, after going through
^^OC, 317.
^^Cf. OC, 318.
^^OC, 319.
^ CC, 320.

the formulation of an entire eplRtemolo'rical and metaphysical
system v/ith many side journeys to attack potential opponents
of the view, Strons; has reached his goal. '''as it a Q-oal worth
reaching'' "as it reallv answered the prcMe-'^s of the relation
of Tiind to bodv and the origin o? con sclou'-mes " ay it not
rather he sai^. that "the b'-.sic stuff seeTis to he called mind-
stuff only hv an act of f^;race."^^ This psvchic character of
.nirid-stuff "is indispensable if when it is arr-i^nged in the form
56
of an organic whole or psyche, it is to be conscious.' "'"hat
aorent is responsible for arrano-.in':^ this 'stuff' in the form of
such an organic whole? Strong's philosophy pro'/ides_ no answer
.
Thus it see-GS doubtful whether Strong actually accomplishes
what he sets out to 6.0. Can the ori~in of mind from this stuff
so lacking in the most important characteristics of mind be
considered a natural process? Apparently these particles of
mind-stuff have t''"'" capacitv o'^ - v^^^n-'v.Ti ^.p-, them.selves into a,n
organic v/Viole caoable of consciousness. Is not such an event
as much an unexplained miracle as ^he arising of mind out of
matter? "Yhy is so much attention paid by Stron,-:^, to the physical
asoect of the self? l^liy is the psvchic state of introspection
laboriously analyzed into a factor matching in complexity the
structure of t'- brain'' "'hy is the mind.-'tuff materialized to
the extent 01 becoming virtually nonmental?
The answer to all
^^:•.^orris, ST:.:, 222.
5^oc, 317.

the questions is probably the idea that the physical aspect
accounts more adequately for the fact of continuity in the
physical v/orld than does the purely psychic side.^'^ Thus is
one of the thorniest problems of an atomistic panpsychisin solved
by calling in the aid of material qualities. The factor of
continuity is accounted for by the materialistic attributes and
the orip'.in of consciousness explained by the ad:tln'~ of the barest
"Dossible asoect of the mental, independent or unfelt parts of a
low c;rade of feeling. This all goes back to the view of Fechner
and Clifford that what unity there is to mind is explainable in
terms of the spatial proximity of the physical correlates. 2:0
wonder^, as Strong s thought develops, he allov/s less and less
significance to consciousness; no wonder that in his later
writings he comes to place more and more emphasis upon intuition,
58instinct, and animal faith. In 1903 he could write that
"since consciousness is the only reality of which v/e have any
immediate knowledge, and therefore our only sample of what
reality is like, we have no other conception of reality. In
1936 he wrote:
'^ost philosophers immensely exaggerate the importance
of consciousness in the world. It is probably a rare
accident, inevitable under the conditions, but without
cosmic significance. Because we see everything through
spectacles of consciousness, we imagine that nothing
can exist in the absence of spectacles; but this is
^"^Strong, CS, 93.
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human self-importance, an amusement to the gods.
Though it is not impossible to see how the second statement could
grow out of the first, an examination of the contexts reveals
a very great change of perspective. The insistence upon the
identity theorv of mind-body relation, the belief that the
orlsln of consciousness should be explainable in terms of a
so-called natural manner of evolution perhaps without sufficient
consideration of epigenesis and emergence, and the growth of a
more pronounced atheism all c mtributed to this change.
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CHAPTER VI
CHARACTERISTIC FACTORS OF WARD'S PSYCHOLOGY
1. Points of Relation with Leibniz
i. Monads as Ultimate Entiti es. This dissertation is con-
cerned with Ward primarily as a modern representative of
monadistic metaphysics. Of chief interest therefore is the
relationship between the thought of Ward and that of Leibniz.
Like Leibniz, Ward accepts psychical centers or monads as the
basic entities of which the real world is composed. "The v/ell-
known Monad ol oQ:y of Leibniz may be taken as the type, to which
all modern attempts to construct a pluralistic philosophy more
or lesq^conf orm. Also like Leibniz he classifies the monads
into various grades, ranging from the lower limit of the bare
monad to the upper limit of a Supreme Being. "The naked,
slumbering monads of Leibniz, the monads whose so-called perception
is absolutely confused or undifferentiated, are as much an ab-
2
stract ideal as the mass points of the physicist." Again Ward
points out that
since the complex iniAolves the simple, bare--or as Leibniz
called thera, naked--monads must exist. And nov/ how are
we to conceive such a bare monad? It cannot be a
dominant monad, for this would imply subordinate monads:
it cannot therefore have a body distinct from Itself.
In some sense then, it would seem, it must be its own
1
RE, 53-54.
^RE, 195.

body or disappear altcrether from the universal connexion
of thin<7s. But we must not understand this to mean that
apparently all mental characteristics: are gone and only
material characteristics are left. The true solution
seems^rather to be that -.v/e have reached the limit of
both.
Speaking of the psychical nature of the bare monad, 'Yard con-
cludes that the noteworthy factor here is that of im :ediacy or
Dure sensation, "an ideal limit to which our simplest experiences
never descend."'^ The reaciiws of such bare monads are alway6
ira.nediate and to what is im mediately given.
Discussing the nature of the dominant monad or soul, Ward
contends f .at this dominance must indeed "be regarded, as due in
part to at least to its in-^.ate or essential superiority, not
solely to the accident of its position."^ To accord v/ith
evolution, however, it must be said that such dominance has not
always been realized, but must at some stage have been purely
7potential.' The relation of the dominant monads to the lower
monads with w'r^ich it is associated at this potential stage is
clearly illustrated by ^/ard in the following words.
Agamemnon and the men he v/as to lead v/ere all much on
a par as infants together in their cradles. And the
fact that as evolution advances diversity increases
suggests that all the differences that eventually
emerc^-.e were originally latent. Such absolute origin as
255-256.
256.
^RE, 257.
^RE. 196. •
'^RE, 196.

the lower limit of evolution is as much beyond all
experience as the absolute beR;inning of his ovm life
is beyondothe conscious experience of any individual
amono! us .
?rhen he comes to treat the subject of 'rod, Ward recognizes
that for Leibniz God v/as more than a Supreme Monad.
'Te approximate. . .to the theism of Leibniz, v/ho was
...driven beyond the limits of his monadolo^^y proper.
Not as Monas monadum, but as transcending^ all monads,
God according to Leibniz as 'infinite intellect' con-
templatesfche absolute totality of possible world and
skives reality to that which his goodness has selected
as the best.
Thus Ward's monadolo'7y in so far as the intrinsic nature
and p^radation of the monads are concerned, is quite similar to
that of Leibniz. In saying that God is something more than
the Supreme 'Conad, he is orobably as he himself thinks, only
carryins out what was implicit in Leibniz's ovm thou^^ht. It is
in t'-ieir inter-relations to one another th.at Ward's monads shovy
their srreatest difference from those of Leibniz.
ii. :.!onads with 'Tindows . One of the fa.ctors in which Y/ard
departs farthest from Leibniz lies in the former's adding
windows to the equipment of all the monads, '.'ferd sees^ln the
windowless character of the Leibnizian monads a symptom of the
sub.iective idealism and occasi^ alism which he rejects, "^^ in-
volving, as he believes the interpretation of presentations as
^RE, 196-197.
9
RE, 197
Cf. '.'^ard, RE, 259-260.

psychic states. Tith respect to the association of bare Tionads
with a dominant monad as in the body-mind relation, Yvard
believes that the windows are clearer between the mor.ads and
other meT.bers of their own a^^sociation than betv;een such T.onads
and me::iibers of ot'-'er asrociations , 'diaohanous' in the former
case and 'opaque' in the latter as he puts it.'^''' In contrasting
the facts of mind with those of so-called physical ohenomena,
\Yard remarks that "no one has followed Leibniz in maintaining
that percipients (his monads) are v/ir>nout windows through which
to look on this common world, but at least he was right in main-
taining that they have no windows by which another can look in,"
This is but one way of expressing the independ "^nce and privacy
of t'r^e individual mind .
iii. "/ard's R-:'-.1ecti on o f rre-ostablished ^armony . The
ability of the Leibnizian monads to mirror the universe in-
cluding its cha.nges without windows was due to the principle of
pre-established harmony. The addition of windows makes pre-
established harmony no lonn:er necessary. The whole assumption
of 'ore-established harmony is, '7ard believes, invalid and does
not fulfil the "ourpose required of it. It leads to too sub-
jective a view. As he says,
We may still entertain the hypothesis that the
"'""'"Tard, W., ^66.
"^Svard, EP, 233.

immediate objects of exper^ence are ultimately, in
so'^.e underground way, offsets or emanatiom of the
subject. if we do this in Leibniz's fashin, --suppose,
that is, that each several sub ject . evolves its own
experience from within, --we have a world which is
really no world at all, a world in which there is no
communit" or interaction, but only the semblance of
them. And even this semblance, as in the famous
example of the two clocks, is onl' secured by the
altogether extraneous assumption of a pre-estahlished
harmony in the respective develooments of the isolated,
independent, v/indowless monads. ^
Actually '.Yard recognizes pre-established harmony to be a form
14
of occasionalism, all types of which he rejects. That '2-od.
should have created m.onads Y/ithout windows and taken on himself
the function of sup':"lyinr' their place--whether continuously as
the occasionalists assumes, or once for all, as Leibniz held--
iilR
seems then a needless complication.
Furtherm.ore Ward saw in pre-established harmony a result
of Leibniz's acceptance of the t'~eorv of preformation current
in his day, "the supposed unfolding of an organism regarded as
completely pre-existing in miniature within the germ." "For
Leibniz indeed it /preformation/ was but a corollary of his
ioctrine of pre-established harmony, that hopeless theological
17pendant of his pluralism."
TI, 119-120.
RE, 250.
260.
98.
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RE, 100

iv. Individuality o f the Monads. It has already been
noted that the idea of there "bein^ no windov^'s through which the
inner nature of the nonad may be observed from without tends
to support its partial independence. 'Yard further a<^rees with
Leibniz that each monad possesses a complete individuality.
"The modern pluralists . . .hold with him /Leibniz/ that there
are never two beinrcs which are perfectly alike and in which it
18is not possible to find an internal difference." Again
Ward points out t'.-iat "experience justifies the doctrine of
Leibniz: no two things are entirely alike, and no two thino-s
are entirely different." This individuality tends to interfere
with the concept of the unity of reality. "On the pluralistic
view every one of the finite individuals is related to all the
rest but only for himself. In t>^e Leibniz ian^anguage each
mirrors the w^ole from a unioue standpoint, and therefore
not the v/hole, hut only an aspect of the whole. ""^^ To go
beyond a mere totality and conceive of unity in the universe
one must make the step from mere pluralism to theism, which is
exactly what Ward does in the Realm of Ends. "The pluralists'
universe in the light of this transcendent Being would thus
20have a unity which it woi;.ld otherwise lack."
18
Ward, RE, 64; Leibniz, Mon . , para, 9.
•^^RE, 228-229.
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2. Interaction between i.Ionads and Hind-Body Relation
The C'-ntral point of the ent're theory of monads is the
mechanism of their interacti on
. Leibniz ex-ola^nea this inter-
relation by means of pre-established harmony. ;.ard contends that
in a world of such things motion, that is to say,
chan-^e would be impos'?ible save through the intervention
of a transcendent cause or prime mover. This difr'icultv,
which the physicist allovrs, is, it is contended, only
to be esca.jed by rer^ardin" matter in more or less
Leibnizian fashion, as but the manifestation of the
interaction qj^^ perceptive and appetitive monads or
ent elechies
.
In rejectin.c; the pre-established harmony and attributin??, windows
to the moi'iads, I'/ard opened the wa;'^ for the introduction, of
another type of interaction, 'sympathetic rapport'.
.
The d.oin^.s and sufferings of persons are both a.like
immediate: what brinG:,s them into relation is a sympa-
thetic rapport or interest that rests upon cognition.
All that is strictly personal in social intercourse is
of this nature. It entirely consists, in the first
place, of the apprehension or the knov/ledge on the
part of :^ne rserson of the 'attitude, ' the feelino:s and
intentions displa-z-ed or announced bv oth.r persons;
secondly in their eooperation or opposition actual or
prospective; and f:^nallv, follo-.vin^ on this, in the
ne-vv feelin^rs s.nd intentions o^pthe person Interested,
t o wb 1 c 1': t e kn owl edge leads."
RE, 62-63.
22
RE, 218. The material quoted above forms the fullest def-
inition of rapport given by V/ard. The only additional remark
of sio;nificance is his identification of rapoort with telepathy
(RE, 463). The term rapport co:nonly refers to an intimate and
harmonious relation. The meaning of mutual dependence which it
expresses- has a special relevance to the interaction between
bare monads. As used by Ward the term rap'oort is similar to the
prehensions of Whitehead, which latter is a more clearly
developed concept. The most com.mon use of 'rapport' in modern
psychology is to describe "the peculiar relation sustained by
a hypnotized' person to the hyonotizer during hvDnosis " ( Baldv/in
,
D?.P, II, 415) .
I
Interaction of this tyoe apnlies even to the bare monad "whose
orff.anlsn, so to say, reduces to a point, and its present to a
-no'nent; which can only react immediately and to what is immed-
"provide all the 'uniform medium' for the intercourse of hirr^her
monads that these can require without any need for such divine
,, 24intervention as occasionalism demands.
This type of interaction of hi'^^her monads through the
medium of hare ones is important as Tard's proposed solution
of the .nind-hcdy problem. The dominant monad or mind has an
especially intimate or functional relation to the lower monads
composing its own physical organism. The relation of this same
dominant -nonad to another dominant monad is nore external and
foreiG;n in character. The lower monads of each organism inter-
act not onlv with their own dominant monads but with the ex-
ternal environment composed of lov/er monads of other organisms.
Thus through the medium of the immediate elements of their
lower monads two dominant mon-ds may establish contact with
PR
each other, may become en rapport .
In some respects '.Yard '-^olls less rigidly to the principle
of continuity than did Leibniz and in other respects more so.
lately given. -.23 These bare monads in V/ard's system serve to
3. The Principle of Continuity
23
'RE, 257.
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Modern pluralist 3, he indicates, "from their purely empirical
standpoint ... could not niaintain that there is an actual in-
26f^nity of monads." In place of an infinite regress from the
complex to the ^;ore simple, V/ard has substituted a merely in-
27definite one, actually attemptinji; to go no further than the
"bare monad w- ich has already been described.
Yet though for ?»^ard continuity does not impi^^ an infinity
of :i;onads , ic nevertheless carries him beyond Leibniz in
affirming that no real qualitative gap occurs betv/een the lower
animals and man.
Even Leibniz, regardless of his cardinal principle of
continuity, was driven to admit a difference in kind
between the s -uls of anima.ls and the spirits of men,
a difference so Q:reat that he compares the relation of
G-od to the animals ?/ith that of an inventor to his
machine, but Crod's relation to men he compares to that
of a prince to his subjects or a father to his children.
At the moment of birth he supposed that ^od gave
reason to each asul 'by a special act or by a kind of
transcreat ion '
.
In neither the biological nor the sociological fields does \7ard
find any evidence of such a gap.
As re'-ards the sociological side of man's origin,
then, the advance from animality to rational personality
through intersub ject ive intercourse, there is, it must
be confessed, prima facie
, neither any definite evidence
nor any absolute need for assuming supernatural inter-
ference. The progress of knowledge and coopera.tion
so Ion a: as we can trace it, the sam.e contingency, the
same 'heterogeny of ends' that characterize biological
-^RE, 64
27
'Cf. RE, 254.
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^ard, RE, 91; Leibniz, Th^odic^e, para. 91. Such a distinction
between anima.ls and m.en is also found in Descartes, Discourse
VI, 57-59.

29develor)ment
.
The develooment of higher forms Ward believes to be the result
of eplo-enesis brought about by the interaction of actual units.
/lealit;- is entirely actuality: the potential, the
possible, the problematic, on the other hand, belong
exclusively to abstract thou.CTht . But that, v/hlle it
never presupposes, is never comrTiensurate v/ith reality.
Actuality a^rain is entirely experience: its factops are
never abstract possibilities, they are living agents;
an?, the result of their interaction is a perennial
epigeneais, the onlv creation that pluralism
recognizes
.
The problem of continuity is fUnda,mental to Ward's
philosophy becau'e upon it rests his entire panpsychism. "Then
he finis psychical nature to be T.ade up of psychical .centers, he
adrr^lttedlv rroes far beyond t'^e eT^pirical evidence.
In support of this bold assumption an appeal is made
to the principle of continuity?-, confirmed as it is
by the fact th-t ever^ advance of kno'vledge so far
has Only disclosed simpler forms of life and further
analogies betv/een organic and what v/e call inorganic.
Yet this principle upon which Ward so stron^vly relies is
contradicted by evidences of discont:^-nuity in nature. The
thecrv of emergent evolution and the behavior of quanta accordir
to modern theories of ""hvs'^cs definitelv -joint to the idea that
there :-'.re leaps in nature, '^et the principle of continuity has
not lacked defenders even in the face of this evidence.
C. Lloyd Tiorgan, bi'-^-elf, \7hile expounding the .-^cc trine of
29
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emerff.ence
, nevertheless attenpta to preserve continuity.
There :nay often be resultants without eTiercrence ; but
there are no eT]erQ;ents that do not involve resultant
effects also. Resultants '^ive quantitative continuity
'vhich underlies nev/ constitutive steps in emergence.
And the e-nergent step, thcu,o:h it rnav seem more or less
saltatory, is best regarded as a qualitative chan5;e of
direction, or critical turnin'-- point, in the course
of events. In that sense tbere is not the discontinuois
break of a frap or hiatus . It may be said then th?-t.
through resultants there is continuitv in pro^^ress . ^2
Furthermore, men were not wantin'-j. who should challenge the
view that f'-e quantum theory undermined the val idity of the
principle of continuitv. Kbhler, while admitting that "quantum
physics demonstrated a strange discontinuity in the behavior
of atomic entities and of lie:ht,' nevertheless insists that
the macroscopic level of physical investigation acpears more
fruitful than the microscopic.
Although the existence of macroscopic things is a
common feature of perceotion and of nature, at least
the apparent continuity of thing-percepts seems illusory
when compared with the atomic constitution of corres-
ponding physical objects. I should, however, hesitate
to adm.it t^-:is much. '.'.Tien we hear that tho pavemont of
the street, that our table, and that our organism, are
much more empty space than anything else, the under-
lying notion is clearly that particles are tin^ bits
of 'matter,' that 7;here we have such matter there is
reall-'- 'something,' while between particles in this
sense there is not much worth mentioning ... .cThat does
it really mean if... we still distinguish betv/een the
electron and its field. I do not knov/ of any empirical
evidence which would support the distinct ion. .. ."/e
still trust 'the particles them. s elves ' more than their
fields, as thoucTh--in the case of the pavement- -we
could safei.v tread on the particles but should beware
organ , '.E
, 5
.
Kbhler, PVIVF, 172.
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of 'mere field.' As a na-tter of fact, insofar as
'particl.es,' are known to be fields and field structures
tbev fill the volunie of a 'Ttacroscopic object compl'.'tely,
and to this extent the object is a continuum. It is
only as a field-continuum thst it coheres. And the
support which t;ie pavement ^' ^rr--'^--, our f-et is entirely
due to this continuum.-^
Even if, in the realms of emergence and of quanta, real
discontinuities are revealed in nature, this very fact pre-
supposes a recoc!;nit ion of t' e orinciple of continuity. AccDrdina;
to Hartshorne,
the real world ir; full of discontinuities (e.-r., the
Q^uantum) . ^u.t these .-i^iscontinuities are measurable as
cr.reater or less because we can see them ao;ainst a back-
^O'ound, of continuity, such as t-v continuity of space,
time, color qualities. Now, that such continuities
are broken in the particular way thev are is a ioTically
arbitrar" fact. A continuity can lot imply any one dis-
continuity, for ever cent inuu;n implies an inflpity of
different wavs in wh' ch it mi2;ht be disrupted.^-'
As ?/erkmeister points out,
even perceptual discontinuity presupposes the notion of
a continuum, and a petitio principii can be a-oided
only if the continuum has^'^irst been defined xYitbout
reference to perception.
Althouo-h the principle of continuity is useful and important,
its application to n.-turc^ I'-j oy no means universal. Although
Mors^an labors to preserve a type of oontinult^ in emer:'^ence,
it is nevertheless true t'^.a.t
the later and more complex f orms ... always contitute a
novum
,
and thus make the evoluti cna-::^v advance dis-
continuous in the sense that the properties and
Ktthler, VYvIF
,
177-179.
35
Hartshorne, EH, 134.
36Werkmeister, .^S, 168.
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characteristics of the latew^ta^^es cannot be rerJuced to
or predicted fro-, t'-'.e r)rop(^rties and the characteristics
'-^f t'- earlier sta^es.-^'
Ktthler'9 contention? thn^-. the ;!iacrosco c level of physicr •
':ore important for practical Tr.irrosen th-^in ? -^..r.,op •
^
no wav :^isproves the fact t:-.t discoatinul exists in tne
latter level. To see whether the principle of continuity
applies in a o-iver. case, e-:oirical verification is necessary.
To use the principle, as V;ara does, as an instrument to probe
beyond empirica] limits seems totally invalid.
Unlike Leibniz 7/ard seems to have beer t;o-9 i^t e>-e=-t,ei in
the law of continuity as a specul:vdve principle than in its
mathematical basis.
Actually the princ--ple of continuit^^ as used in support of
:Vard's panpsycMntic t-eorv of nature involves the implicit
presupposition that the re] tions of real ohi-cts to ':^od must
'
all be external. The t^e— that all entities t: -
-hvsical
world mu^^t be ps-chic centers analogous to the human mind over-
looks or denies the concept that the objects of physical nature
could be interna^v related to '^-od and onl v oers-ns need be
considered as externally related to Him. Such a theor- of pan-
entheism would, to be sure, involve a ?^ap between the Physical
world ana the world of oe-sons, and hence would deny the
orinciple of c-ntinuity. Yet in view of the limitations of that
principle, would the theory of V-e internal relation of the
37
71erkm. e i s t er
,
PS, 507
.
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r)hy8ic.?J worlci to '^-od "be any less e^^ir^caJ. than V^e oan-
psvchistic theory?
It is the influence of the princir'le of continuity that
causes Ward, to re.iect occa;->i ona'l i <^ '', in f.9."""^r o"f h^ s t'''eor'"' of
sympathetic rapoort between doininant iTionacis tnrcu ii the rnediurn
of the interaction of hare monads.
Since we cannot actually verifv the indefinite re'^ress
which the existence of bare monads implies, and since
we cannot show that the indirect mediation of our
finite intercourse is not a fact, v/e have no means of
decidincr between th? two alternatives. The most that
v/e can say is that the pluralist alternative is the o
•-^"ior as 'e^l as the simpler, and it seems adequate.-^
A,<2;ain '.Yard speaks of occasionalism as "t "0 cumbrous , and , so to
39
say, unscientific, to be inte'i.lectua'' ly satisfactory." Such
a stateme^^t seems not only too a priori and do'^matic, but uses
the term scientific in a '//ay which '.Yard frequently opposes in
40
t'-e pol'emic of his Naturalism and Aornosticism
.
Finally, '"ard ' s use of t-'^^ "orinciple of continuity appears
to run counter to the observable evidence for continuity and
order in n,':^ture. r-sinT, the principle to ejtablish the existence
of an indefinitely Irr^e number of con^^tive and co!^nitive
psychic entities of a lo\7 type seems to be an inadequate method
of accountin'7 for v/hat order, uniformity, and continuity there
^^RS, 260
i
39
RE, 257.
40
Ward frecuentlv attacks certain of his contemooraries for
usin^ the presti'^re o!" science to disseminate their own philo-
soohica") views (cf. NA, I, 8f f.) . Is he not <Tuiltv of the same
offence y;hen he terras occasionalism 'unscientific'?

is in physical nature. Associations of such entities, v/ith
each entity posser.- ^ '-^ - • ^-
-
-
-
-blance of autonomy, '<vould hardly
explain it. Sympathetic rapport between such entities seems
unoT^pirical to the point of utter fancv. Anl a 1-o:5 faced vvith
the tash of cottrd/m tin- '^^ lare.e a group of simple uni' uld
be busier than any C-od of who-n an occasionalist would be likely
to conceive.
r
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CHAPTER VII
INFLUENCE OF THE PANPSYCHISM OF STRONG- AND WARD
1. The Influence of Strong
i . Stron f?; 's inf uence upon other c ritic al rea-lists . For
most of his career Strona; was associated with the school of
critical realists which included Durant Drake, Arthur 0. Love joy,
James ^issett Pratt, Arthur Kenyon Rogers, Roy ?/ood Sellars,
and G-eorge Santavana. In 1920 Strong contributed to the volume
edited by Drake entitled Essays in Critical Realis m.. For a
time he was an outstanding defender of the vehicular theory of
knowledge, which v/as held in some form most critical realists.
Thus he bridged the gap between mental states and objectively
independent things by means o"^ a datum having the nature of a
universal essence. Later, as has been seen, he abandoned this
viev;, conceiving the datum to be rather a particular phantasm
general ed by the activity of the self. Though Drake was the
only critical realist who completely follov\red Strong in his pan-
psvchism, there is no question but what Strong wielded a
leading influence over the entire critical realistic movement.
He was held in especially high esteem, bv Sellars and Santayana.
ii. Strong's influence uDon his opponent s. Though Sellars
was not far from Strong's episte-''olo(3:i cal position, he was as a
Physical realist metaphysically quite far removed from the

latter 's mind-stuff theory. In his review of Tb e Ori g;in of
Consc iousness Sellars says, "It has helped me to clarify my
thought on many points and forced me to deffend my own pre-
possession."''' Later he adds that "it is a warni^"- t'^-^t both
neo-realist and idealist must be prepared to meet a nev/ anta-
gonist in the comins; years." Actually it is his op onents
amon^. V-^e neorealists that were most impressed, '"e was an
untiring critic of their theory of knowledge, continually
pointing out that it made no place for the factor of error.
Actuallv r.Iontague wrote answers to these attacks and showed
an increasin-^l V favorable attitude toward panpsychism. In his
review of Strong's A Creed for Sceptics Montague goes so far
as to say that the type of panpsychis i which he favors differs
4 S
somev/hat from that of Strong. Spauld;ing, -'^ as has previously
"been mentioned, attacks the double-aspect theory in a wav
which appears to shoxv his familiaritv with Strong's version of
it. In fact a number of critical treatments of the mind-stuff
theory are apparently directed chiefly asainst Strong even v/hen
his name is not mentioned. The acuteness of his arfr.uments
-"Sellars, Art.(1919', 319.
^Sellars, Art. (1919), 319.
^Cf. Montague, Art. (1924), 578-582; Art. (1912), 272-278.
Cf. Spaulding, NR, 268-273.
l^ontague. Art. (1938), 58O.
5
^E.j., Pratt, PR, 214-215; Santayana, RM, I8I-I88,

appears to cause opDonents of the theory at once to search for
an3?;ers . ^^e has a way of ansv/er*in<7 possible ob jections to his
view even before thev have been brou.n-ht aQ:ainst it by others
t'at is very effective an:!! at times not a little disconcerting
There seems little question but what his influence upon his
opponents has been of considerable wei(2;ht.
iii. Strong;
'
s plac e in phi los ophy . In modern philosophy
what place may be assigned to Strong? How important a fin:ure
is he? In this re<3:ard the words of Charles 'Y. Morris are
worthy of note.
The attention which Charles A. Strong has devoted to
the topic of mind gives him a central place among the
critical realists in this respect. No contemporary
philosopher has 7/ork?d more a.bly or persistently on
this problem. It is accordins-ly advisable to consider
his position in some detail, especially since it unites
upon a panpsychist ic v/orld-viev/ motives found
in critical realism v;ith an emphasis upon behavior as
vipc'^rous as that of any prac?mat ist .
'
To this should be added the tribute of Strong's close friend,
Santayana, who says of him,
Never was fortitude more entire than in this man. Sure
of his vocation, if not always of his steos and his
method, he continued undaunted by ne^xlect and comparative
isolation, never losing confidence in the importance
and ultimate success of his labours. Nor was he turned
aside by the hopel ess and protracted afflictions that
affected first his v/ife's health and then his own,
Crinpled and physically helpless for twentv years, he
keot a single eye upon his chosen task, tirelesslv re-
vising and perfecting everv detail of his theory.
Morris, ST''^ 217.
'Santayana, Art. (1940), 596-597.
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Also worthy of note are these additional words of Santayana,
co'^nparinp; Strons; ' s phlloso 'hical method to his own.
He was measure, "oersi stent, scientific; I was raoid,
sce":'tical and ironical. He had zealously preserved
his alleo-iance to a traditional morality and a precise
scientific truth as the heart of reli.a;ion; .vhereas I
tolerantly observed relio-Aon always superposing itself
upon truth and ^norality upon nature.^
Surely this comparison is not unfavorable to Strong.
The question not fully answered by these tributes concerns
the full nature of Strong's contribution. Mow original v/as
his work? Did he select the most important points for his in-
vestigation? ^.Vhat permanent value attaches to the result of
his labors? Strong's last article,''"^ written upon his death bed
was an attempt to clarify the -Qosition which he had finally
reached. Ke still classifies himself as a critical realist and
points out the relation of his critical realism to his accep-
tance of the concept of substance. As for his debt to his Dre-
decessors, he is now no lonoier talkin^r about Fechner, or Paulsen,
or Clif-^ord. In this last article it is Spinoza to Hhorn he
expresses his great obligation.
Yet though the basis of the double aspect theory is found
in Spinoza, Strong's s-<''Ste^n most closelv resembles thc.t of
Clifford. Strong's work comprises an able presentation and
defense of V^e mind-stuff theory with the double-aspect theory
of mind-body relation. Yet is there anything here that was not present
^Santavana, Art. (1940), 597.
•'"'^Strong, Art. (1941) .

either exDlici tlijor lmolicit)iln the thouo-ht of Clifford? This
see-Tis
.
somewhat doubtful. In one respect at least Stron^c seems
definitel^T inferior to '^lifford. The latter, it will be re-
membered, found the objects of Physical phenomena and the
ejects by which he reco.?7,ni zes the existence of other minds to
be the result of a process of inference ."^"^ In place of such
inference Strong rel.ies chiefly upon intuition and animal
faith.
Concernino: his choice of ouestions for investigation, it
has already been pointed out (Chapter V) that Strong had a
preconceived notion of what must constitute the natural ori^rin
of mind out of nature. His entire svstem might be viev/ed as
an attempt to find logical and em.pirical evidence to support
this a prl ori concept. Yet his combination of logical and
empirical arguments lead, as we have seen, to a rather incon-
sistent position with respect to the use of analysis. He dare
not carry the logical analysis too far lest aiysemblance of
the psychical be lost and his conceot of the natural origin of
mind should be lost. On the other hand, in order to reconcile
t>^e continuity of nature with the type of mind-stuff \7hich he
has postulated, he must sacrific virtually all significant
factors of the m. ontal to^ physiological . In order to explain
the assembiin'^ of psychical particles into a whole by means of
"^Gf. Clifford, LE, 274-236.
^^Cf. Strong, ENM, 92-103.
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the spatial Droxi-nity of their physiological aspects, he is
forcei;! to deny even the un^.tv of mind. The changes in his view
throu-^.h the vears mostly take the form of additional con-
cessions to physicalisT. until in his last articles he seems to
"be slipping away even from, the shadow of the mental which still
remains in his view of "basic reality.
Strong's contribution may then be that of clearl'^'' showing
that the mind-stuff theorv of realistic panpsychism is an un-
tenable compromise between idealism and materialism, that once
one has gone so far as to "believe that sentient reality is
composed of particles having both physical and psychical as-
pects, there is nothing to prevent one from bein!:' completely
submerged into the quicksands of materialism. Strong's life
work has shov?n that not even the inn:enuity of a truly great
philoso hical mind is sufficient to place such a theorv on a
sound empirical and logical basis. Strong's masterful
treatments of epistemology will certainly retain their importance
as lonp; as American critical realism in its original form re-
mains a prominent viev/point. His work on the mind-body pro'olem,
however, acute thout^h it may "be, rests to too great an extent
upon the quest iona"ble substance or mind-stuff. One leaves a
study of Strong's writings v/ith the feelino; that he has been
in the company of a great mind who wrongly formulated the prob-
lems to be attacked and who consequently devoted his
intellectual talents to the defense of untenable positions.
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2. The Influence of V^ard
i. Ward's Influence upon Pritl sh idealism. As has already-
been indicated '"ard ' s influence upon the psycholo«-v of his day
was prohably greater than that upon metaphysics. Yet upon
British ideallsT. the effect of his work was quite marked. At
the time when he be,.;3;an his work, the central emphasis of British
idealism lav in absolutism of the Hegelian type. He was res-
ponsible for promoting a pluralistic movement in idealistic
circles. In fact the growth of the pluralistic tendency among
idealists, voluntarists and pragmatists alike, v;hich took
positive form near the turn of the last century was 'probably
partly due to the Influence of '.fard . Yet aside from his
general influence upon British philosophy and particularly upon
British idealism, ?/ard ' s im"oact upon a select group of promi-
nent disciples was a most important factor. Such men as
G-eorge F. Stout and F. R. Tennant may have been more instru-
mental in 3-oreading Ward's ideas than he was himself. In fact
so great has bean the influence of Stout upon British thinking
that the ileas of '.Vard which he has emphasized have met with
wider acceptance than any other points of his svstera. Tard's
influence in Britain has soread beyond the limits of the
idealistic group and. has had cons'* derable effect upon the
thinking of s'jch realists as Samuel Alexander and John Laird,
ii. Ward's influence upon later oanosychism . Ward may be

109
said to have "been one of the first recent Dhiloso hers to have
accepted Leibniz's monadisiu as the basis for a systeji of
theistic pluralism. Since then the type of metaphysics based
upon Leibnizian monads has become more widely accepted airong
philosoohers in both England and the United States. The actual
entity of ".Tiitehead, the cell of Stace, and, the monad of DeiVitt
H. Parl^er all belong to variations of such a modified monadism.
'."ard saw in the jionadology of Leibniz "the type, to which all
modern attempts to construct a Pluralistic philosophy more or
less conform. ' ;.";ore recently, in his Experien c e and Substance
,
publ.ished onlv last vear, Parker states that "the natural and
inevitable type of metaphysical system, is some kind of
^ T m14monadology.
iii. Ward's plac e in phil o sophy . Rudolf 'vletz in his treat-
ment of '.Vard rem-r.rks that seldom, has a man had so important an
influence in his ov^rn nation and at the same time so little in
the wav of reoutation outside its borders. Outside of his
psychology he received some name for his attacks upon certain
we]l-known scientists who v;ere opposed to reli(3;ion and the
sr-iritualist v/orld-view. Such men as Haeckel, Clifford, and
Huxley he visorousl^.^ opposed. Th'^ough ths''-ma,nn'fer-'-lnr 47hich^ K^^^^^
^"^Parker, ^S, 345.
15
Cf. ^:etz, HYEP, 399.
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opposed them ./as confused, the fact that much v/hich he dil
attack h; : since ceased t. o exist in the sa;ne form may show that
this part of his 'vork was not '.v^^thout its effect.
Mext to his crreat work in the historical developmont of
British psycholo'^-y , the value of Ward's lator may actually be
in rer'-ivin,^; and modifying- Leihnizian ^onadism. The preformation
theory, the pre-esta'-:lished harmony, t';" ^ ' .'less monads, and
oth'^r theories Ward discs-rded as incomp.^ tihle v/ith scientific
discoveries, "^^et he retained, the central idea of nature con-
sisting of psychical entities oi a low decree of corKv.tion and
c05n.it ion. The fact t'-at in this way all monads, high and low,
havi^ extero 1 rel-r-tions with ."Tod dif f er e^^tiates this position
from abs:;lutism. ?roba::ly the weakest point in the monadism
of both Leibniz and '.Ya.rd is their reliance upon continuity
as a speculative principle.
To be sure, this monaui -.^ti c system cannot now be empirically
verified, no":^ does there seem to be much hope for such a veri-
fico.-f-ion T n t'^e ^uture. And the position is not dem-nded to
sa-i:=fv abstractly'- lon:ical considerations. Nevertheless
the fact that so raanv leadin-" ohJ.losophers do accept such a
16
Cf . Perry, PPT, 90-98. "There have been two m.ain ways of
defendin.^ spiritual interests acrainst natural i-^;tic deductions
from the results of science. All that the scientist is inclined
to claim for the universality of his laws may be granted freelv,
and then the stin'? removed bv reinterpreting the y;hole situation
in such a way that m.echanism now enters as a subordinate element
into a higher catercory, which, accordingly, does not compete with
it at all. Or, on the other hand, '.Ye mav a '.tempt tn various was
to weaken -the force of the scientific claims themselves ... .'Yard ' s
criticism does not identify itself unambiaiuously with either of
these -et'-ods" (Rogers, EAP, 329-330).

panpsychistic system without empirical confirmation clearly
indicates that many do recoc?;nlze stron'^ loor.ical reasons for
acce^'itinn: it.
The monad istic system advocated hy V^^ard makes no such com-
promise with mat rialism as does the mind-Btuf- theory of
Strong. It is at once thoroup:hly idealistic and as oluralistic
as is compatible th theism. Yet it is difficult to see ho¥/ a
physical nature composed of hare monads connected only by inter-
action and with a semblance of freedom can lo{2;ically account
for the observable uniformity and order within the world.
3. Progress of Panpsychism beyond Strong and Ward
^ • Increasin g; evidence from the philosophy of s cience .
The evidence of physical science has shattered materialism. Not
even the most extreme physical realist can longer adhere to a -
belief in the existence of matter in the sense ?f solid atoms.
The reduction of physical nature to the activity of electrons
and perhaps of waves and quanta ma:e5it easier to interpret it
as ments.l in nature. Further, as v/e have seen, certain discon-
tinuities in the behavior of quanta, might conceivably be ex-
plained by t'^e behavior of monads. However the microscopic data
support the 'oosltion of monadism better than the macroscooic
phenomena. It may be a ;'iisnomer, however, to sav that this
could result in progress beyond ^^tronp; and Yard, since Strong
knew about most of the advances in physics and Ward many of them
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i/.ost indications, however, point to the idea that idealism has
little to fear from future discoveries of physical science,
ii. Other pos s ibilitie s of pro,g;re33. The monadistic pan-
psychist has always had in some wav to account for the
appearance of t'^e bare nonad to the senses as physical. The
hi;?her monad -^ad a body made up of the lower, ref^,ressing
down the scale until the bare monad constituted its own body
ard v/as therefore c':aracterized by immediacy. There has been a
tendency upon the part of more recent believers in monads to
admit' frankly the presence of a physical element as a part of
the unit. Thus the physical and mental pole of '.Vhitehead ' s
17
actual entity, ' and the consciousness and datum composing
18Stace's cell are not intended to impair the unity of these
fact rs but rather better to ex'olain the nature of and functioning
of f'^iese entities.
There has also been a tendency on the part of som.e
IQ
monadists to abolish the concept o: substance, and this of
course constitutes a real pialn the direction of greater
emoiric^sm.
This wr'^ter believes that anv further proftress of pan-
and this includes idealistic panpsychism.
VThitehead, ?R, 366.
18
Stace, NW, 36.
19
Cf . '^-.Itehead, ?R, 44.

paychism must take the direction of the monadistic type rather
than the mincl-stuff t^ne, Stron-^, it 1?. fJ-'r)W''^_^t , n - r-:^-, eci. t'-:e
mind-stuff theory as far as possihle. _he theory is very
limited; Strong exploited all of its possibilities that are of
anv in^ortarce. In oth«r -.^ordG it is meanin-^ful tc n -e"' of
progress beyond the panp-:ychism of Ward; it is probably
me -leas to speak of pro'?:ress beyond the panpsvchism of
Q+,^^,^„ latter 's premises are adhere:!, to.
I
CHAPTER VIII
SOJ/TE IT'.IPLI CATIONS OF PANPSYCHISM
1. Ps^rcholO'-'ical iTiplications
The psycholOR;ical implications here discussed refer to the
distinction hetv/een soul psvcholoorv and self -psycholop:y . In
his earlier, more idealistic, days Stron;<j held to a theorv of
self ^svcholon-y, re.lecting any unconscious substratum and
helievinT that the mind was identical with its conscious ex-
per'-ence.
The existence of consciousness is our existence. If
the soul should continue but consci ous-:ess cease, we
should be as ^ood as nonexistent; whereas if the soul
should be annihilated but consciousness still a;o on, we
should exist as truly as now. Thus our existence is
bound up w'th that of consciousness, not with that of
the sou; or, as I said before, the existence of con-
sciousness is our existence.
In his later thouf^ht when he considers consciousness to be only
a functional relation and when he rejects even the unitj^ of
mind, he obviously also does not believe in a substantial soul.
Yet he has a" so dropped self -psycholoc;y in favor of a mental
atomism of tne Humean tyoe. This, it would seem, is the natural
iraolication of the mind-stuff theory.
In as far as the monadistic theor-^'- is followed, soul
Dsychology m.ay be implied. It seems possible that, despite his
^Wiffi, 200.
I'1
I
own assertion to the contrary, "Sard's distinction between the
s-ibject self a:id object self, I and me, knov/er and known, a
duality v'ith the unity o:.' experience --nay imoly soul psycholo.Q;y .
'
Surely it is not self -osycholoq;y . A^^ain he makes the rather
ambi";uous statement that "instead of regardin^z all souls as
substances, we have proceeded rather on the s^ir^. tualistic
intertDretation that all substances are souls. "-^ Parker accepts
4 5 6the view of soul substance, whereas "^tace ani "Tiitehead re-
ject it. The conclusion seems to be that raonadism may imply
either soul psycholocry or self -psycholo-^^y
.
2. Panpsychism and Freedom
Strong, while recognizinsc the experience of choice, ccon-
tends that,
though everything is fated, a man himself as a
portion of fate, and the nost important portion in
what concerns himself. Plessed be causation, which
by being universal ensures that our wills should
have gratification. That their character which at
each moment is determined partli^r by hereditv and
partly by ths influences that have acted on us need
distress us .
'
^Cf. Ward, "^P, "55-36; R^, 26.
^RE, 392.
ES, 64-65.
^KHY, 9.
^^.'mitehead, PR, 44.
^CS, 95.
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This does not in itself abolish freedo.ai, since the two forms of
determination may imply a possibility of free choice. Yet as
Strong G;oes on to attribute the basis of morals entirely to
instinct, the mea.nin% of freedom if it does exist seems to be
of small si.^nif icance. From the standpoint of the miiid-stuff
theory it is difficult to conceive of man beinpr, anything more
than a cre-^ture of instinct, having no real freedom whatever.
V/ard's treatment of freedom, is complicated by his inclusion not
only of the subject of causal determination in nature, but also
by th-^.t of theological determination. However, his conclusion
seem.s to be that between fixed possibilities the crea.ture has
the opportunity of free choice. As he outs it, "The total
possibilities ... .however f?.r back we 2:0, are fixed, but within
o
these, cont in5;encies , however far forward we go, are open."
A limited tyoe of freedom Is also permitted by the mionadists,
Parker a'-^d Stace. Accordincc to the form.er,
The freedom of the monad consists of the inner spon-
taneity of the matrix self, together with the fact
that, however much it vields to the pressure of the
environment, it modifies the environment in its turn;
thus it is true that the world has made me w^at I am^
it TS also true that I make the world that makes me.^
Accordin^T to '^tace, "that I am free means simply that my actions
--in so far as the^ are free--issue from my conscious valuations
as their cause. ""'"^
8
RE,- 315.
^ES, 275.
'"^NW, 70.
iI
Thus monadistic panpaychism appears to allo'.v as much freedom
as any type of idealism.
3, Panpsychism and. the FrolDlem of Evil
Strong's view of the problesn of natural evil is clearly
stated as follows:
Let a man note what ha -pens through the years--earth-
quakes, floods, pestilence, wars--and ask himself
whether it is conceivable that a v/orll in which such
things are possible v/as created, by or proceeded from
a mind; he must honestly ansv/er. No. Let him regard
the same question re-rarding specific human ills. In-
sanity--how can goodness or intelligence have produced
that cruellest and most debasing of inflictions? The
different forms of disease, the innumerable varieties
of insects in tropical forests, the sea which covers
far more of the earth's surface than the land, the
stars thpt are so beautiful to look at but so de-
vastating to think of, the vast desolation of inter-
stellar space- -all prove that the universe was not
made for man or by a bein^ like a man, but is what it
is, P-H ever bLirnin'^ fire.
for -itrong the existence of evil is no more of a problem than
that of good. The latter problem, however, he fails to re-
cognize, let alone to solve. The mind-stuff theor""' is an
inherent]. V nontheistic system, conceived as such by Clifford
and necessarilv so by its very nature. A philosophical amateur
like Eddin'^'ton might indeed read a type of theism into the
mind-stun tiaeory, but a philosooher of .Strong's caliber, such
a thing would be impossible.
"or 7ard evil cannot be ultimate; "CrOd and Evil in word,
Strong, GS, 93-94.
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are contraries: if the problem of evil is alto.rrether insoluble,
there is an end of theism: if .-,-oi exists there is nothing
12
absolutely evil." Actually ';Var:l takes the position that evil
is a natural and inevitable result of prcrress of the indivi-
duals within the universe toward the real'^] of ends.
The world, ever pressing forward, entered on the sta.ve
of conscious life as soon as it was possible, not waitina-,
until the fierce strife and turmoil of the elements
had wholly abated, but rather driven b^- struc>;rling with
these to new adaptations that tended to raise it above
them.... The pressure of physical evils having first
led to the solidarity'' of the social state, this has
ushered in the attraction of, those ideals that Hegel
called the objective spirit.
Natural evil as illustrated in the process of evolution is
treated by 'A'ard in a trs.ditional manner. "If we ask why the
way is so long a.nd the progress so devious and so slow, we can
but su-'O'cose that it is so because onlv so can the pron-ress be
thorouga s,nj. the v/ay assuredly the best."''"'^ It see/iis evident
thus that "I'ard's treatment of evil is one of the least empirical
parts of his sveterr.
. There has been a tendency for more recent
1^
monadists, including Stace, Parker, Hartshorne, and Vfnitehead,
to explain the existence of evil by means of the doctrine of
a finite 'rOd.
•^^Ward, RE, 319.
^^RE, 440.
^^Stace, 254.
16
Parker, ES, 358; ;\^itehead, PR, 524, 532.
I
4. Panpsychisrn and Immortality
It Is obvious from his treatment of the Droblem of evil
that immortality on Stron^^'s later theory would be impossible,
nor is it easy to see how it coul-il be postulated by any
follov/er of mind-stuff.
Ward, on the other hand, attempts to esti.blish the
metaphysical possibility of immortality and to argue for it on
moral rrrounds. "The moral ideal, as it leads to faith in 3od,
leads a"" so to the belief that the spirit world has other
dimensions than those of time and space that encompass the
17
world of phenomena."
RE, 429.
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this dissertation " - to investi.^ate modern
panpsychism, especially as it is expounded b^^ Janes Ward and
Charles A. Strong. To this end the historical background and
conte-n.porary status of panpsychism are surveyed, the factors
coin::ion to Ward and Strong examined, the individual character-
istics of these two thinkers set forth, their contributions
evaluated, and so-?.e implications of their panpsychism traced.
From its background of primitive animism, G-reek hylozoism,
and mediaeval vitalism, panpsychistic metaphysics has follov/ed
t'vo different lines of development. The first resu.lted in the
monadistic theory, the outlines of which have been laid down by
Leibniz and followed with modifications,, bv all monadists, in-
cluding lYard. The second or min:--stuff theor^- orio-inated with
^echner's modification of S-inoza's d ouhle-asoect theor^^. The
more explicit formulation has been set forth bv "filliam K.
Clifford and further developed by later thinkers, including
Strong.
Both Ward and Strons-, are empirical in the sense that they
consider immediate ele-ientary awareness as experienced by human
persons to be the clue to the nature of the physical world.
For both, the real world is of the nature of mind and so quali-
tatively monistic. Both treat psvcholo^ical data as of primary
importance. In the thought of both, evolution holds an im.portant
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place. In the case of Stron-'- the mind-bodv protlem itself
R'P'oeflT'^ to he r^ec '^'"i V-i,'*^'^ to t^''© ^v>,'-^'^^^ •^^ ho'" ^1i'"d c^/" he oon~
ceived to develop naturallv?- out of the physical order. 7ard,
however, emphasizes e"igenesis.
Strono- heo-ins v;lth an a 'oriori concept of ^rhat nust con-
stitute the mind's natural orl-:?ln out of tne physical order.
He then looks for evidence that mind did develop in just this
wav. Accept in- the d^ubl e-s.soect theor'>'" of rnind-tody relation,
ne conceives tnat the mental experience revealed t'-roun;h intro-
spection is identical with what appears as brain v/hen perceived
through the senses. Applying t':^^F: -rinciple to nature, he
finds that w'-'at is perceived h" the senses as matter also has
its psvc'-^ical aspect. He finds the phys' oloaiical structure of
t'--^ brain t" be extre-aely complex and the nature of conscious
experience to he apparently quite simple in the sense of hein^^
a unity. Hence in order to make the mental aspect riore nearly
correspond to the physical one, he applies a process of analysis
to the former. If the brain is a complex of parts, so also
must be the mind.
This process he supports by a carefully formulated dualiatic
epist emologv in which consciousness is reduced to a functional
relation and osvchic states become t'-e vehicles bv which data-
are given to t^:e self or psyche. Stron-rt's self is similar to
that of Hume; it is a series or stream of psychic states. The
psvchic state is, V'^en, the psvche in a certain state, flind is
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divided into these psvchic states, examples of which would in-
clude sens^itions, mental iman-es
,
enotions, desires and, above
all, atterit ion . Thoup-h a psychic state whici consists of a
sin^r.le feelins appears to possess unity, Stronrr finds th3.t even
such a feelin" is composed of lesser, more ^.inute feelino-s.
Thus all ,:.::vchic states may be conceived of as the sum of simpler
parts. The idea that such psychic elements or minute feelin??:s
mav exist independent of the osychic states of which they are
for t-.e time beincr parts leads to the further concept of mind-
stuff, that is, the postulati?n of even simpler parts which are
a,ll of the same hind. Thi?. anal-"-sis into independent feelinc^s
forms the transition fromj epist emoloc^y to metaphysics and shows
the organic relation of the two in Stronc?;'3 svstem. Thus
"^"•^on^, n '^oirr^ be"'''on-3 t''.e g^-.-^-rip ns^rcht.c state, admittedly
carries his analysis farther than empirical ev'dence allows.
Yet he is reluctant to carry thJ s process of analysis to its
natura,l culminati^^n in neutral entities. '-'e is stopped neither
by strictly empirical nor strictlx^ lo-'-ical considerations, but
rather by an a priori factor, his determination to preserve
some se.'hlance of the "^'^-^chic element beca,use he wants continuit3''
in evolution from lower to higher forms. Once he abandoned
.mind-stuff in favor of neutral entities, his panpsychism would
be gone.
Strong.' s solution of the mind -holy oroblem purports to
include the best elements of the identity theorv, interaction,

136
and automatism. Yet an examination of this synthetic treatment
reveals that its value denends chiefly'- on the va"". idi t-''- o'' the
identity t'-^.eory. Amon.^ the several defects of this douibie-
aspect theor-'- of mind-lDodv relation, the most important is the
difficulty of fin 'in^c the exact correla,tions between the nature
and activity of mind and brain t^.at would be expected of two
appearances of an identical factor. Stronc: attempts to meet
this difficulty b'"' analvzin-r the mind in such a wa','- as to show
its likeness to the physiolocrical structure of t-.e brain. Since
the^^atter may be analyzed into minute parts, this must also be
the case with the former. The reason for his atte":pted reduction
of the mental to the physical rather than the opposite procedure
1' es partlv in his effort to exolain the hi-her in terms of the
lower, an^. partly in his scepticis"^ -r^ respect to values.
The following out of this idea of reduction leads inevitably
to more and more concessions to materialism.. The mind-stuff
into wnich 'rtron^ analyzes both t'-'^e self and the ohysical world
is conceived as in time as in space, as caps.ble of change, and
as possessina: a psychic c'-^aracter. Stron'^ denies real unity to
m.ind . and its apparent unity he attempts to account for by
proximity of its parts in space. To follow the course of
Stronf3:'s thoup-ht from ":?e,a;inninT to end is to observe one
concession after another to materialism until hardlv more than
the name Dsych.ical remains, '''et , since the r)ure analytic method
deals with matter more adequately than v/ith mind, the more
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material is tic he ^rows the -nore lorical he 'DeconeG. This
prohahlv indicatea that realistic pan'osychism is an impossible
compromise, an unstable position, the lo-^ical irirolicati oria of
which leads one inevitably away from mind as a category to
soraethinn; material or ns-utral.
The raind-atuff into whic?i Strono: analyzes psychic states
has little of t'-e mental left a<". out it. Its particles are,
however, capable of combiniris in such a wav as to form minds.
The monadlstic panpsychiam of \tl»Tcl^oa the other hand, ma'ies no
such conces-. ion to materialism. Rather the psychical centers
or mo'^-iis each possess a '^enuine unity, ind''. vidualitv and in-
dependence. Thouc^h the bare monads feel confused and eleiiientar^''
awareness, their structure is patterned after th.t of the higher
morads suc'^^ as human minds. Thus even .the simplest monads
mirror the entire universe and possess conative and co--r;nitive
functions. The hicrher monads may in no sense be analyzed into
t'.'e lov/er, thoufT'i t-'e^r d'^ become closelv associated with the
lower
.
The svstem of 'ard differs from that of Leibniz in that
the former's m.onad3 '^a.ve 'windov/s ' a^^i io not depend upon a
schem.e of pre-established harmony to sr,overn their interrelations.
Ward's discarding, of ore-established harmony is partly the result
of the t"'e"-r'" of eDi'-enesis which had ro:':'laced. the pr ef orm.ation
fneorv o-r" T eibniz 's dav . in -fard's system the organism of the
bare monad is reduced to a ooint and its present to a moment;
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its reactions are immediate and li-nited to wh'-it is immediately
.o;iven. These bare monads 'in i-nteraction wit^^ one another form
the medium of comnuni cati on cetween dominant monads or souls.
Each hare monad is in a sense its own bofiy and also c^oes to
mahe up part of the ho''^,'- g-^me dominant mnnal. The hare
monads formin?^. the body of a particular soul have an ei;--:pecially.
intimate relation ,?ith each other and with that soul, and they
possess a less close but equally real relation .vith monads out-
side their own association.
•
, 'Yard's
orefcrence for such a monadism over some for^ occasionalism
as a solution of t':"e mind-body problem does not appear to rest
on a.nj very explicit empirical or lo-rical considerations.
'Yard's means o:^' -^oing beyond t-'^ .empirics.lly justifiable
is the principle of continuity, derived mainly from Leibniz.
As interpreted bv Ward this principle implies that a.Ll reality
is structurallv and functionally of one kinl. In ar: indefinite
repress from the more complex and highly developed to the sim.pler
and lower all real entities possess in some measure the attri-
butes experienced as belonging to the human mind. No ^aps are
reco'mized between various a:radations of these entities. Even
the break between lower animals and human beinfr.s ^which Leibniz
admitted is denied by Ward. -v plac^n-r ^-od beyond the' order of
m.onads , he. considers that he is able to reco-'nize a gap between
the hiThest monad and '-od without violating, this orinciple of
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continuit.y. Yet the factor of mutations in emergent evolution
and- the behavior of quanta as revealed by recent physical in-
vestigations indicate eoipirical^. - "'-^it the principle of continuity
is not sufficiently^ reliable to beco::ie the sole support of such
a monadistic theory of the pr.ysical world. Actually the the?rv
that the physical .;orld is made up of a large nu:noer of psychical
entities of the type of the bare monad see;'ns inadequate to
account for the observable unif o:--- -it" and ord.er cf nature.
Important to Strono- was his association with the American
critical realists, '"e contributed much to the development of
t^^eir distinctive theor^^ of Vnm'ledsr.e, and it seems probable
that his work in epistemolo"v will be considered of more value
than his metaphysics. Kis keen analysis of problems and his
penetrating, criticisms of opposing; views -?ave him an important
voice in philosophical circles and frequently caused those whom
he criticized to reconsider and at times revise their theories.
Especiallv was this true of Sellars an-^ "ontague. Though he
devoted his life, eve;: durin-r lonT, years cf illness, to the
development and perfection of his mind-stuff theory, it seems
that he advanced ver^ little be^-ond the ear'ier formulat 1 :"n oi
W.K. Clifford. Settinsr himself to the task of perfecting this
view, Strons: may be sa-" d to have revealed that it was not worth
the effort, '^'is o"'n frequent changes c'' e-- -'^^ be considered
an indication of the inherent instability, unt enacility , and
general weakness of the theory v.'hich he espoused rather than

of its fruitlessness
.
In the case of 'Vard , his influence on .'.ritish iiealis:.': in
promotln • a chan'^.e of emphasis from a'Dsolutis:.a to plural is'^i
was very ^reat . I'is influence has continued to live in the work
of such "T-ersonal l^'.scioles as Stout and Tennant . ' least of
'Yard's contributions lay in s/.ov.-incr that such a incnb.i.istic
panpsyohism as that oric^inally formulated by Leibniz could be
"Tiodifiei and 'nade c?mpatib'_e 7n.th the evidence of recent science
The more recent -nonadi^tic syste.Tis of "Tiitehead, Stace, and
Parker amonp; others indicate that, unlike the mind-stuff theory,
."^
'^n d i. s i c "C?,npsv ,-:^hiST is a fertile field containing room for
much further development
.
The mind-stuff theory as held, by .Gtronsr denies man any
meanin<3;ful freedom, making him onl-^^- a creature of in-itinct; it
is nontheistic, treatin?? the factor of evil as a matter of
course but offering no explanation of tho existence of good. As
held both by 7/ard and '^r^r more recent thin'.-e^° , f^^.e mona-iistic
theor^'' may implv either soul psycholo'vy or self -psvcholof^y
,
makes c?"enuine freedom of choice between determined alternatives
probable, exolains t"^ ~ 9-^-.^o---. -.-^o^nr^ni ?vil either b"'
denying that it is ultiT*"'telv evil ("'ard) or by the finitude of
"'':^d 'Parker, Stace), and implies the metaphysical possibility
of imm.ortality
,
relyin.T on mor-"l -rsiuments to support its
probability.
i
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Conclusions
:
1. irodern theories of panps^rchism are reiucible to two
major types, the monadistic tj.'^pe represented in recent thou-ht
by Ja'?:es '.Yard and others and the mind-stuff type represented
by Charles A. Stron.^.
2. The Tionaiistic theory holds the simple psychical entities
which compose the physical v/orld to be structurallv and
functi -nai Iv analogous to t^e human mind but not to be analyzed
parts of a more co iplex monad : every monad of every ??rade is
an"^ndivisible unit; hence the monadistic t'~e:r; reco^rnizes
the unity of consciousness.
3. The m.ind-stuff tneory holds the sentient elements which
com.pose the physical ^vorld to be minute parts analyzed out of
psychic states which were in turn analvzed out of t^^e human
self or psYCi'.e; hence the human mind is c nsiderel to be an
apparent but not a real unity; real unities are simple fueling
units
.
4. The mind-stuff theor"" ba-ses its acceptance of the
double-aspect conce t of m^'^d-bodv relation and its anal^ysis of
f-a -nn n^ ' >^ t, simplo gT -'^'^ s on t'^'^e a?'=v.m"tion that t-'e mf^ntal
must be cstructura"' 1''^ like the physical; hence the mind-stuff
theory is a compromise with mat -rial ism , a materialization 6f
mind.
5. The analytical orocess by which Strong reaches mind-
stuff should lo-^'i call'^'- culminate in neutral entities and a
1i
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rejection of panpsychism.
6. 'Vard ' s view of the existence of bare mona-fis as t'-'.e
"basis of the physical '•/'0:^ld n-oes bevond e:".pirical evidence. It
is supported by t^;^e principle of continuity, the universal
validity of w' ich is no\7 empirically challen»;ed "br biolO"-y,
emergent evolution, and phvsics, quanta.
7. V/ard's preference for explainincr, the mind-body reU-.tlon
as interaction of the dominant monad v/it'r? the lover monads over
an explan;--ti on in ter"':iS of occasVonalism is not based on
strofT'^. empirical or losjical consideration.
8. The Philosophical -oossibilit ' es of the mind-stuff theory
have been ui, ..rour^hly explored by Strong and no further important
development in this branch of panpsvchism seems probable; the
monaaistic t'^.eor" has already been carried beyond the state
represented by "'ard b^- such recent writers as '.Whitehead, Stace,
and Parker, and its possibilit " es are h no m-ans vet exhausted.
9. The mind -1 tuff thecr*' i? o^en orally nontheistic,
providing no metaphysical oasis for values an 5 ideals; the
monadistic theory is general Ij^" theistic, Drovidins? adequate
basis f or va."' u e exp
-^r i en c e .
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